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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia there has been continuous opposition by
intellectuals and the opposition to the government’s policy of making Ethiopia a landlocked
country.1 Some totally reject the secession; while, others accept the independence as a “fait
accompli” and voice concern over the lack of an outlet to the sea, and others acknowledge the
right of self- determination and the secession of Eritrea but denounce the inconsistency of the
application of the Transitional Charter regarding the Red Sea Afar2 and the Algiers Agreement
for denying Ethiopia its legitimate right to access to the sea and allege that the government is
acting against the paramount national interest of the country.3

1

Michela Wrong, I DIDN’T DO IT FOR YOU, How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation,
Harper Perennial, (2005) Wrong writes on page 379
“While Meles still maintains he has no designs on the cost, his people are less restrained. The curse of the Queen
Sheba has returned with a vengeance in Ethiopia, with opposition parties, civic groups and independent newspapers
all arguing that Eritrea’s duplicity has proved Ethiopia must secure its own port.”
2

The Afar Revolutionary Democratic United Front, which has been, and still is, fighting for the Unity of Afars of
Ethiopia and Eritrea , within Ethiopia, see Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut, War in the Horn: The conflict between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, pp 17, the royal institute of international affairs(1999) ,Sultan Ali Mirah the traditional leader
of the Afar ethnic group declared that Afar is one and the Red Sea Afar should be allowed to self- determination and
join Ethiopia during the Conference of the Transitional Charter, Interview with Lieutenant General Tsadkan former
Chief of Staff and a participant of the Conference
3
I was a member of the Central Committee of the ruling party (Ethiopia Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front)
until 1994 and as one of the highest commanders of the Ethiopian Defense Forces, had the opportunity to know what
actually the government’s position was. I am not implicating any new secret or unknown position of the
government, but we really believed that the governing legal regimes are the colonial treaties and the national interest
of Ethiopia can only be upheld by accepting the ‘reality’ and promote peace to fight poverty. I used to think that
(and may be most of the party and state officials) those who raise the right of access to the sea are those who reject
the new Constitution, especially Article 39 which is a guarantee of nations and nationalities on self determination,
and who are adherents of the feudal and military dictatorships as war mongers who do not accept the independence
of Eritrea. I used to reject the views of those who were struggling for the right of access to sea with out rendering
them ‘the benefit of the doubt’. The Eritrean invasion and confiscation of all Ethiopian properties which were

2

Access to the sea is an important issue in Ethiopian politics that needs to be addressed
and the issue should be dealt with beyond the incumbent government. Ethiopia regained the
right of access to the sea by the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations
1952. After about 40 years of enjoyment of its sovereign right it is again in the verge of
permanently becoming landlocked. The present government of Ethiopia has agreed and signed
the Algiers Agreement that could make Ethiopia a landlocked country. If the opposition wins
the next election or any election there after, it may officially denounce the Algiers Agreement
and demand a new arrangement that recognize the right of access to the sea.4 It is believed that
access to the sea is one of the burning issues that contributed to the success of the opposition
and the declining support of the government during the last election.

located at Asseb and Massawa, the two “Eritrean ports” that Ethiopia used to get service from, made me question the
issue of the access to the sea. After I retired from the Ethiopian Air Force I was in a better position to listen to the
arguments of those who were calling for the Algiers Agreement to be terminated and a new treaty that acknowledges
Ethiopia’s right to outlet and allowed me to deal with Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea as one of my legal issues
to research upon. Why we had that position is a mystery that history may tell. To me, it is a combination of
ignorance and arrogance.
4
The Manifesto of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the strongest opposition in Ethiopia states that
“landlocked countries are less attractive for direct foreign investment than maritime ones, attracting only 34% of the
latter. The TPLF/EPRDF move on this issue is eminently one of treason. • Although the legitimacy of Ethiopia’s
demand for a sovereign right of access to the sea is legal and well realized by the international community, the
intransigent position taken by the ruling party has closed the door for the possibility of discussing the issue.
Therefore because the question is interlinked, the legal question of sovereignty and survival of the nation, a request
will be put forward before the international community for a balanced support.”
http://www.kinijit.org/static/KINIJIT-MANIFESTO-English-ver-1.0.pdf

Some of the former executive and central committee members of the ruling party denounced the Algiers Agreement
and some of them are on the verge of setting up a new political party with a platform of sustaining the supposedly
lacking real democracy of Ethiopia and protecting the sovereignty of the country. Recovering the Port of Asseb also
lies at the top of its agenda. July 01 2007

http://www.addisfortune.com/Former%20TPLF%20Members%20to%20Establish%20New%20P
arty.htm
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In this thesis, I argue that Ethiopia has the right to access to the sea as recognized by the
recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly of 1950 which was implemented
accordingly by federating Eritrea to Ethiopia. I recognize the right of self-determination and
independence of the Eritrean peoples, but, argue that the independence of Eritrea and the
sovereign right of access to the sea of Ethiopia are not mutually exclusive. The legal regime that
governs the territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea is the “treaty between the United
Nations and Ethiopia’ or strictly speaking as the ‘treaty between the Victorious Four Powers of
WWII and Ethiopia’ according to which Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia in 1952.
The peoples of Eritrea have decided on their fate and become independent and their
wishes have been fulfilled by the blood that they paid during the struggle for their
independence. But the ‘treaty between Ethiopia and the Four Powers” is not only about the
wishes of inhabitants of Eritrea: it is also about the consideration of the security of East Africa
and the legitimate need of Ethiopia to access to sea. In fact, I argue that the main objective and
purpose of that ‘treaty’ is the right of Ethiopia access to the sea. The foundation of any
settlement that is meant to solve the territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea should be
the recommendation of the UN General Assembly of 1950 and international law, which
guarantee Ethiopia’s right to access to the sea.
I also argue that the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties between Ethiopia and Colonial Italy
cannot be the basis for resolving the current territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
First, Italy breached the treaties by invading and occupying Ethiopia. Ethiopia invoked material
breach of the treaties and declared them null and void according to customary international law.
Secondly, the latest UN recommendation as a ‘treaty between the Four Powers and Ethiopia’

4

supersede the former treaties. Even if Italy had not breached the treaties, the treaties of 1900,
1902, and 1908 are made irrelevant by the latest ‘treaty’--that is, the recommendation of the
General Assembly as delegated by the four powers and implemented half a century ago.
This thesis does not address the Algiers Agreement as a whole nor the legal solutions to
the obstacles that this agreement may have created. This thesis establishes Ethiopia’s right of
access to the sea under international law and treats the Algiers Agreement as an anomaly that
should be discarded. The Algiers Agreement is mentioned intermittently to clarify and ascertain
Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea.
The thesis begins by reviewing the background history. A short description of the
geography and demography of the Horn of Africa is followed by the geo-politics of the region.
The modern history of Ethiopia and Eritrea starting from the ‘creation’ of the colony of Eritrea
and up to present is described chronologically. The paper continues by addressing the problems
of landlocked countries in general and their ramification to the economic and security of land
locked Ethiopia in particular. The thesis then analyzes the different legal regimes that may
govern the territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The bilateral treaties of 1900, 1902,
and 1908 between Ethiopia and Italy are brief discussed. The invasion of Ethiopia by Italy and
its legal consequences are broadly discussed, based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which is declaratory of customary international law regarding material breach and
termination. The paper continues by discussing state practice on material breach and termination
regarding territorial treaties. The Munich Agreement and the Riga Treaty of 1921 are taken as
examples. This discussion concludes that, the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy was a material breach

5

of the treaties and that Ethiopia had the right to declare the treaties null and void, which it legally
did according to international customary law.
Chapter 4 of the paper then addresses the treatment of Eritrea after the Second World.
The first section of this chapter discusses the meaning of the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy-especially the renouncement of its African colonies including the Ethiopia-Italy treaties of the
first decade of the 20 century and the process of the disposition of Eritrea. It describes the
position of the Four Victorious Powers on the disposition of Eritrea and the alterative proposals
presented. It then continues to show how the issue was dealt with by, the United Nations General
Assembly and the conclusions reached. UN Resolution Eritrea 390 A, recommended that Eritrea
should constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the
Ethiopian Crown, and enumerated the basic tenets of the Federation. This section argues that the
legal effect of this resolution vis a vis, the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties was that even if Italy did
not invade Ethiopia and the treaties were not made null and void, this Resolution makes the
earlier treaties irrelevant. The recommendation5--which was made pursuant to a delegation by
the Four Powers –in essence constituted a “treaty between the Four Powers and Ethiopia”. The
thesis argues that, that treaty is the governing legal regime that regulates the

relationship

between Eritrea as an independent state and Ethiopia

5

Recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations do not have binding legal effect on issues out
side the United Nations organization itself. The Four Powers which were the successors of Italy’s rights on its
colonies decided to accept the recommendation of the General Assembly and implement it and as such the
recommendation is the decision of the Four Powers who had the right over the Italian colonies pursuant to the Paris
Peace Treaty of 1947. Shaw described it as: “In the event, the United Nations, given a determinative role by the Big
Four Powers, decided to maintain the territorial integrity of the unit, partly because of the views of the parties
involved and partly since the territory was administered as one unit. Shaw, Malcolm, Title to Territory in Africa,
pp119 Oxford University Press (1986)

6

The thesis argues that in light of, Article 31 of the Vienna convention on the law of
treaties, the main objective and purpose of the “treaty between the Four Powers and Ethiopia”
regarding the status of Eritrea was that Ethiopia should have security and the right of access to
the sea. The thesis concludes that because this resolution is the governing legal regime whose
main object and purpose is to implement Ethiopia’s recognized right of to access to the sea,
implementation of this right should be the foundation of any territorial settlement. The paper
then discusses the opportunity lost in implementing this right during the1998-2000 War between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. It concludes by a short recommendation.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND
Geography and Demography of the Region
The Horn of Africa which consists of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia, is roughly
three-quarters of a million square miles in the northeast of the continent that juts out for hundreds
of kilometers into the Arabian Sea, and lies along the southern side of the Gulf of Aden.6
Ethiopia is the center of the Horn of Africa and is bordered by Djibouti 349 km, Eritrea 912 km,
Kenya 861 km, Somalia 1,600 km, and Sudan 1,606 km.7
Ethiopia shares different ethnic groups with its neighbors. There are different ethnic
groups residing in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya. As will be discussed later, the most controversial
are the Somalis residing in Ethiopia and Somalia. In Ethiopia’s Somalia Region there are 4.5
million while in the country of Somalia there are 7.7 million of Somali speaking people. Directly
related to the issue of access to the sea are the Afar people. Of the two million Afar people more
than one million are in Ethiopia and the rest are in Djibouti and Eritrea.8The Afar extends from
the Gulf of Tadura -(Djibouti) to the Gulf of Zula Eritrea.9

The Afars who inhabit the Asseb

zone of Eritrea make up 3% of the population of Eritrea.10

Asseb separated from the main

population of Eritrea by over 400 kilometers and developed closer economic connections with
central Ethiopia than it did with the rest of Eritrea during the period 1938- 1991. Consequently,
Asseb symbolizes the issue of Ethiopian access to the sea, which drove Ethiopians long struggle
6
7

8

Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, 1 Carnegie Endowment for International peace, 1976
CIA: The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html

David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky, Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia, 2004, the Scarecrow Press, Inc. see
also the CIA: The World Fact Book on Somalia
9
Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, pp6, the Scarecrow Press Inc.1998
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to gain and retain control over Eritrea.11 The cultural ties between the Red Sea Afar in Eritrea
and the large majority of Afar is so firm that most do not recognize an Eritrean Afar12 There are
four million Tigreans in Ethiopia while nearly two million are in Eritrea (about 50 % of the
population of Eritrea)13 Kunama minorities reside on both side of the border in Ethiopia and
Eritrea.
All countries bordering Ethiopia have one or more sea outlets except Ethiopia which is
allegedly denied an outlet to the sea by the Algiers Agreement. The population of the countries
are as follows;14
Djibouti

496,374

Eritrea

4,906,585

Somalia

8,863, 338

Kenya

36,913,721

Sudan

39,379,358

Ethiopia

76,511,887.

Ethiopia has Christian 60.8% (Orthodox 50.6%, Protestant 10.2%), Muslim 32.8%, traditional
l4.6%, other 1.8% (1994 census).15 Most of the Christians are in the highlands of the country,
while most Moslems are in the lowlands and all of the bordering countries in the region.

10

Id
Id
12
Tadesse Berhe and Yonas Adaye, Conflict in the Afar and its Impact on Sub-Regional Stability, unpublished,
(2006)
13
See note 8 p378
14
CIA, World Fact Book, on the mentioned countries, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/so.html
11

9

Geo-Politics of the Region
The intent to control the Red Sea and the passage to the Indian Ocean makes the Horn of
Africa a strategic area. The attempt of the Arabs to make the Red Sea an “Arab lake” and the
spread of Moslem fundamentalism coupled with the role of Egypt and its vital interest of
controlling the Nile River makes the politics of the region complex. The perceived differences in
national interests of the different countries in the Horn complicate the relationship of the
neighboring states which is abused by other power out side the region especially Arab countries.
As early as 1952, the constitution of Syria identified the “Arab home land” as a national
home for the Arabs. It consists of the area that extends beyond the Taurus Mountains…. the Gulf
of Basra, the Arabian Sea, the Ethiopian mountains… the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean
Sea, and constitute one single complete unit, and which no part may be alienated.16 The Iraqi
Baathists and the Palestinian Liberation Organization used to treat the Eritrean struggle as an
inseparable part of the Arab revolution, when Eritrea was part of Ethiopia.17 The late President
Sadat of Egypt observed that the Red Sea is an Arab lake.18 Arab countries have been interfering
in the internal affairs of Ethiopia on the pretext that Ethiopian Moslems are being persecuted.
Egypt’s interest in utilize the waters of the Nile in disregard of the rights of the upper
riparian countries is one of the issues that shape the politics of the region. Professor Haggai
Erlich describes the importance of the Nile and how it is intermingled with Pan Arabism and Pan
Islam:

15

16

Id
Daniel Kindie, the five dimensions of the Eritrean conflict 1941-2004, pp267 Signature Book Printing, Inc.
(2005)

17
18

Id
Id 268
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“It has to do with the very existence of Egypt. As these lines are being written, the “gift
of the Nile” enters the twenty-first century facing an ever-deepening controversy over its
waters. In the coming decades, gradually and perhaps inescapably, the Nile River will
become an issue of life and death. Egypt was the capital of both state and political Islam.
It was the Nile centered state that aspired to control the greater Nile basin. It also became
the capital of the modern Arab revolution that threatened to unite the Moslems of the
horn of Africa.19
In 1997, the Egyptian government launched an ambitious desert irrigation plan, namely
the Toshika Canal, which, upon completion, would increase Egyptian dependency on the Nile
and intensify Egypt’s commitment to exploit its “historic rights” to the fullest possible.20 Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, reacting to the launching of the Toshika project “He accused
Egypt of striking a ‘proprietorial attitude’ over the waters of the Nile river and charged that
Egypt was trying to maximize its use of Nile water in order to make it impossible for an
equitable quota system to be negotiated. The Egyptians treated the waters of the Nile, through
Toshika project and the 1959 agreement as though they were a purely Egyptian affair rather than
one concerning all the states in the basin.”

21

The Nile delta is rich in silt brought from the

Ethiopian Plateau which makes the soil the most fertile in Africa.22 Ethiopia provides 86% of
the water that Egypt and Sudan consume and the Egyptians have tried to control the source of
Blue Nile from the 19th century onwards. Khedive Ismail Pasha of Egypt attempted to control
the source of the Blue Nile by invading Ethiopia.23 However, his army met crushing defeats in
1875 at Gura and then at Gundet in1876.24 Egypt has continued to abuse its leadership position
19

Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile, pp1, Lynne Rienner Publishing, Inc.(2002)
Id 214 Water pumped from Lake Nasser and brought to the Western Desert to the Oasis of Farafara and Alkharji,
would irrigate vast areas and provide the infrastructure for eighteen new towns and hundreds of villages. A huge
pumping station, the largest in the world, at Lake Nasser would be completed by 2002. by the year 2017 these
waters, representing some 10 percent of the quantity collected each year in lake Nasser.
21
Id 214
22
Nile River." Encyclopædia Britannica. <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9108302>.)
23
See note 8
24
Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut, War in the Horn: The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, pp 20, the royal
institute of international affairs(1999)
20
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by coordinating, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Saudi Arabia in an effort to weaken Ethiopia on
the assumption that a strong Ethiopia would be in a better position to assert its right.25 Three of
Ethiopia’s neighbors--, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti-- are members of the Arab league and
Eritrea is becoming a conduit for the Arabs who want to disrupt Ethiopian development. In
Contrast, Ethiopia is primarily perceived as a “Christian Island’ because Christianity was the
state religion of Ethiopian Emperors before 1974, even though it has been a secular state after
1974. Of course the dominance of the Christian elite continues to this day. The disrupting
activities have been done through Ethiopian opposition armed groups and neighboring states like
Somalia which had fought a number of wars with Ethiopia. ‘Pan-Somalism’ or ‘Greater Somalia’
is a unifying factor in Somalia that attempts to unify Somali speakers in Djibouti, Kenya and
Ethiopia. The Journal of Foreign Affairs discussed the legitimacy of Ethiopia’s concern by
stating that:
The Ethiopian government had a number of reasons for taking out the Islamic Courts.
Ethiopia and Somalia have had a tense history, including three wars between 1960 and
1978. Somalia has hosted al-Itihaad al-Islamia, a terrorist organization that planted
several bombs in Ethiopia in the 1990s, prompting the Ethiopian government twice
during that period to send troops into Somalia to destroy the group and dismantle its
training camps. Last year, senior court officials made clear that they intended to
incorporate Somali populations in the Somalia region of southeastern Ethiopia into a
greater Somalia. They were already backing Ethiopian opposition groups such as the
Ogaden National Liberation Front and, in southern Oromia, the Oromo Liberation
Front.26

25
26

Id
Prendergast& Thomas-Jensen, Blowing the Horn, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2007 at 63, 64
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The Modern History of Ethiopia and Eritrea
Ethiopia which included the present-day Eritrea is one of the oldest countries in the world
though not in its present shape.27 A unique, African civilization emerged at the beginning of the
first millennium A.D in the northern highlands of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Axum, located in the
Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, flourished for almost seven centuries and become one of the
most powerful kingdoms of the ancient world. The kingdom extended across the Red Sea into
Southern Arabia and west to Sudan’s Nile valley.28 Ethiopia is also the place where humans
originated, as evidenced by the finding of “Lucy” or” Dinkinesh”.29.
The modern history of Ethiopia and Eritrea began with the Italian occupation of Asseb in
1882 and the possession of part of the Abyssinian highlands in 1889,.30 On March 15 1883 Italy
concluded a treaty of peace and friendship with Mohammed Hanfire, the Sultan of Asseb and
chief of the Danakil (Afars).31 The name Eritrea was given to these regions occupied by Italy in
1890. In March of 1896, Italy invaded Ethiopia from Eritrea but was defeated at the famous
battle of Adwa.32 Ethiopia and Italy agreed to delimit the boundaries in treaties of 1900, 1902
and 1908.33 The delimitation was far from clear and the demand of Ethiopia to demarcate the
boundary fell on deaf ears.
Italy again invaded Ethiopia in 193534 and occupied it until 1941.Italy had started to
reorganize its ‘East Africa Colony’ from Eritrea in the north to Somalia in the south east in

27

See note 8
Id
29
Id
30
Rubatino Shipping Company purchased a coastal tract adjoining the small village of Assab in 1869. in 1882
Assab was transferred from the Company to the Italian State. See, Stephen H. Longrigg, A Short History of
Eritrea,p113, Oxford Clarendon Press, (1945)
31
See note 8 pp 1i,
32
Bahiru Zewde, History of modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, 2nd ed. ,77 , Addis Abeba University Press(2001)
33
See note 8
34
See note 32 at pp 153
28
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different regions. But, British and Ethiopian forces drove the Italians out and Ethiopia regained
its independence n 1941. Eritrea remained under British administration until 1952.35
The UN in its resolution in 1950 decided that Eritrea should be federated with Ethiopia as
an autonomous entity under the sovereignty of Ethiopia and it was federated in 1952. The same
year, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia declared the treaties signed with Italy null and void.
The Emperor abrogated the federation and made Eritrea the 14th province of Ethiopia in 1962.
An armed struggle had already started in 1961 in the lowlands of Eritrea by Eritrean
groups demanding independence36 Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in 1974 by a military
junta.
In 1991, the military government of Ethiopia was ousted by armed opposition fronts, led
by Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) and a transitional government was formed.37
That same year Eritrean fighters entered Asmara and occupied all the places that they claimed
were part of Eritrea with the exception of some villages around the boundary area. These
Eritrean fighters formed a de facto government.38 The transitional charter of Ethiopia that was
meant to be the “constitution” for the transitional period recognized the right of nations and
nationalities to self determination including by means of secession.39
Eritrea was recognized as an independent country after its people voted for independence.
Ethiopia was instrumental in getting the recognition of Eritrea by other countries and by the
United Nations by becoming one of the first countries to recognize the new state of Eritrea.

35

Id 180
See note 8
37
Id
38
Id
39
Transitional Charter of Ethiopia No 1 Negarit Gazeta, 1991-07-22, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 1-5
36
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Initially, the two governments had relations40 that were admired by many as exemplary although
many Ethiopian held resentments over the relationship alleging that it was to Eritrea’s advantage
41

The honey moon did not last long, however. In 1996 and early 1997 Ethiopia tried to tighten

the uncontrolled economic relationships between the states. Eritrea was frustrated and relations
deteriorated 42
In May 1998 Eritrean forces invaded Ethiopia using mechanized forces by occupying
north-west of Ethiopian town of Badme. Ethiopia demanded the withdrawal of Eritrean forces
from occupied places and the restoration of the ‘status qua ante’. 43Eritrea rejected this demand.
In 2000, in what has been estimated to be the biggest battle on African soil since the expulsion of
Nazi forces from Egypt during the Second World War,44 Ethiopia practically annihilated the
Eritrean armed forces and liberated all occupied areas. In the Algiers Agreement, Eritrea was
forced to accept a humiliating cease-fire agreement which created a temporary security zone
within its ‘territory’.
The Algiers Agreement created two commissions, a boundary commission and a
reparation commission.45 The Boundary Commission was given the task of delimiting and
demarcating the boundary according to the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties between Ethiopia and
colonial ruler Italy and according to international law.46 The terms of reference in the agreement

40

See note 24 pp 10
Id 15
42
Id 47
43
See note 8 pp 20
41

44
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automatically made Ethiopia a landlocked country. The opposition

47

and many intellectuals48

opposed the agreement and unsuccessfully pressed the government and the House of
Representatives to reject the proposal.
The Algiers Agreement has stalled. The new Secretary General’s most recent report
warned that:
The continuing stalemate in the peace process shows no sign of ending, and the impasse
has the potential to not only lead to renewed hostilities between the two countries, but to
destabilize the wider region, especially given the recent developments in neighboring Somalia.
Ethiopia has refused to implement, fully and without pre-conditions, the Boundary
Commission’s demarcation of the border with Eritrea, even though its decisions are supposed to
be binding under a peace agreement that followed a two-year war in the late 1990s. For its part,
Eritrea has maintained a troop presence in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) along the border,
as well as tanks, rocket launchers and guns, and it has also imposed a ban on UN helicopter
flights, severely restricting the work of UNMEE.49
Many intellectuals and the opposition allege that the Algiers Agreement is a betrayal of
Ethiopia’s national interest and that, what ever result, may come from that agreement,- it will be
a time bomb that may explode at any time and affect the peace and stability of the region. Many
Ethiopians feel that their necks have been slashed by the secession of Eritrea and by being made
landlocked and the same people think that it is only for some time before justice is done. The
Red Sea is only 60 kilometers from the “boundary”, a reminder of the strategy of isolating
Ethiopia and weakened it so that it would be ‘ready’ to be colonized by Italy.
Lack of Access to the Sea and its Impact on the Economy and Security
The economic and security issues are also important factors to consider when one
investigates the right of access to sea, although these factors alone cannot be sources of
47
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sovereign right of access to the sea. Modern economic progress requires rapid, reliable, efficient,
and cost-effective international trade. Kishor Uprety cites the United Nations Commission on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) stating “the actual experience, like the logical historical
evolution, proves that the absence of access to the sea constitutes a major obstacle for economic
and social development.”50

Uprety lists the major economic difficulties that land lock countries

in the developing countries face as
a) Additional transport cost b) Foreign trade deficit, trade between land locked and
coastal developing states is rarely important because the two economies do not
complement one another; on the contrary they often enter into competition for foreign
and external resources within the international market. Land locked countries face
additional economic burdens that flow from their lack of access to the sea. They depend
heavily on the transport policies of transit states including payment of a portion of their
transport costs in convertible currencies and bear increased costs resulting from the
necessity of warehousing stocks, port delays and expenditures in the itineraries of reexchange. c) Access to the resources of the sea on the same terms and conditions as
coastal states.51
Ethiopia’s export and import ratio as laid down in the data below, shows the importance
foreign trade and that, obstacles to this trade have grave ramifications on the development of
the subsistence economy.
Current account balance: -$3.384 billion (FY05/06 est.)
Exports: $1.085 billion f.o.b. (2006 est.)
Exports – commodities: coffee, qat, gold, leather products, live animals, oilseeds
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Exports – partners: Germany 15.5%, China 10.5%, Japan 8.5%, Saudi Arabia 6.9%, Djibouti 6.
8%, Switzerland 6.4%, Italy 5.9%, US 5.5%, Netherlands 4.2% (2005)
Imports: $4.105 billion f.o.b. (2006 est.)
Imports – commodities food and live animals, petroleum and petroleum products, chemicals,
machinery, motor vehicles, cereals, textiles
Imports - partners: Saudi Arabia 14.7%, China 12.6%, US 12.4%, India 6.7%, Italy 4.6%
(2005)52
Poverty is the main enemy of Ethiopia, and the main threat of Ethiopia’s existence
originates from it.53 There can be no long lasting peace, stability or security when a state’s
system cannot feed, educate, or maintain the health of the great majority of its people. Denial of
access to the sea is a source of insecurity because it hampers development. Ethiopia may use the
ports of its neighbors Djibouti, Berbera, Zeila, Mombassa, Massawa and even Port Sudan. But,
political uncertainties and the influence of other foreign countries have made it very difficult to
rely on them because Ethiopia will constantly be vulnerable to blackmail. In western Europe the
landlocked and transit states have managed to devise a system of international rivers, special
transit rights, free zones in ports and arrangements to secure the relatively free flow of goods
and people between the landlocked states and the sea. In unstable Africa where the system of
governance is not institutionalized access to the sea depends upon circumstances. Coupled with
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the geo-politics of the region this makes Ethiopia a high risk and vulnerable country. Belai
Abbai and Zeru Kihishen a former minister and a politician in describing the security threats
said that:
Ethiopia’s historic enemies will attempt to strangle her from the sea, if she is denied its
own outlet to the international waters. As in the past, Egypt, because of its strategic interests on
the Nile will attempt to destabilize Ethiopia to prevent her from focusing her development
efforts on the Blue Nile basin. With Eritrea and Somalia controlling the waters, the potential for
destabilization will always be there to be activated at the most critical moments maximum effect
by any of her historic and strategic adversaries. Those who control the ports used by Ethiopia
for importing and exporting its goods and services will also be in a position to collect all
intelligence data for hostile purposes.54
Somalia’s irredentism and Djibouti’s position, Arabs perception of Ethiopia as a
Christian state and the advent of Moslem fundamentalism, the question of the Nile and the role
of Egypt in the Arab world makes Ethiopia permanently vulnerable in its security and ability to
use alternate outlet to the sea. Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are members of the Arab League.
The Port of Mombassa of Kenya is too far for most of Ethiopia and the Eritrean government is
allegedly becoming an instrument of Egypt and Libya. Even tiny Djibouti tried to black mail
Ethiopia after the Eritrea- Ethiopia war. A commentator on the Ethiopia situation said that:
To take a similar situation, since the seizure of the Bolivian port by powerful Chile in
1879, the date that that started the “Bolivian National Neurosis” there had been a number of
wars between Chile and Bolivia, numerous changes of government in Bolivia, with each
successive regime demanding that Chile return the sea coast. The same national neurosis may
hang up in Ethiopia in a much consolidated way if the Algiers Agreement is implemented.55
But Ethiopia is not the Bolivia of South America. Ethiopia enjoyed an outlet to the sea
until recently. It is militarily the strongest country in the region and one of the strongest on the
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continent.56 Ironically, however, it is in the verge of losing its right of access to the sea despite
having won the war with Eritrea. . The most populous country in the Horn and the third in
Africa57is in the brink of loosing one of the essential elements of its survival. As a result, it may
become the most populous landlocked country in the world.58
To sustain long-lasting peace, security, and stability Ethiopia has to get rid of poverty.
Poverty can be minimized and eradicated if there is immediate and sustainable development.
One of the vital instruments is international trade which demands efficient, cost effective and
competitive market. All obstacles to this trade and especially the transit process should be
tackled with. External forces who do not want Ethiopia to develop may exploit Ethiopia’s lack
of an outlet to the sea and destabilize Ethiopia.
The security of Ethiopia significantly affects and may be decisive of the security of the
region because of its strategic position. A country denied of its rights and “a people that feels
injured and betrayed by the deal must eventually destabilize both countries”59 This is a vicious
circle. To break from this circle Ethiopia has to regain it’s legally recognized, historically and
economically based sovereign rights of access to the sea.
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CHAPTER 3
THE 1900, 1902, 1908 TREATIES BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY, AND THE
INVASION AND THE OCCUPATION OF ETHIOPIA BY ITALY IN 1935
The 1900, 1902, and the 1908 Treaties between Ethiopia and Italy
The famous Ethiopian General Ras Alula who later became the governor of the area that
is now Eritrea, in asserting Ethiopia’s rights against the Italy proclaimed that “ I have beaten the
Italians once [ at Dogali], and I will beat them again. As far as I am concerned, Ethiopia’s natural
frontier is the Red Sea and that the Italians will get land in Ethiopia only when Alula becomes
Governor of Rome”.60

The ports of Massawa and Asseb were switching hands between,

Ethiopians Egyptian and later Italians. But as announced by Ras Alula, Ethiopian rulers never
abandoned their right access to the sea and fought with Egypt and Italy. Ethiopian warriors
defeated a more ambitious attack launched from the coastal city of Massawa in which the
Egyptian forces were almost completely destroyed. A fourth Egyptian army was decisively
defeated southwest of Massawa in1876.61
In 1889 Emperor Menelik, signed the Treaty of Wichale giving the Eritrean highlands to
Italy.62 The Italians tried to swindle him by having two different versions of the treaty, one in
Amharic, and one in Italian; with different version of Article 17. The Italian version stated that
“The Emperor consents to use the Italian government for all the business he does with all the
other Powers or Governments.” Whereas under the Amharic version ,“The Emperor has the
option to communicate with the help of the Italian government for all matters that he wants with
60
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the kings of Europe”.63 When Menelik realized that he had been cheated he rejected the treaty
and ceased all gratuities from the Italians. The Italians invaded Ethiopia and at the famous Battle
of Adwa Ethiopian forces led by Emperor Menelik defeated them. Humiliatingly routed and with
as much 70 percent of the Italian forces killed, wounded, or captured, the Italians were forced to
abandon their claim to a protectorate over all Ethiopia. The Treaty of Addis Ababa, signed in
October 1896, abrogated the Treaty of Wichale and reestablished peace. Why the Emperor
stopped the war then and sought peace in stead of pursuing the routed Italians and reclaiming the
lost territories is a mystery. For some it was merely a prudent decision not to undertake an
impossible military adventure with logistical night mare, to others it was an act of treachery64
Erlich entertains both views “Menilek realized that he could not afford pressing the Italians too
hard and risk meeting them in Eritrea where they were entrenched in heavily fortified positions.
62
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He probably also felt that a reoccupation of Tigrean-in habited territories would strengthen
Tigrean political aspirations.”65
The Treaty of Addis Abeba was followed by different treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908,
to delimit the boundary between Italian Eritrea and Ethiopia and in the case of the treaty of 1902
among British Sudan, Italian Eritrea and Ethiopia. The 1900 treaty delimited the north and north
and west borders of Ethiopia with Eritrea. : Art. I.-The line Tomat-Todlue-Mareb-Belesa-Muna, traced on the map annexed, is
recognized by the two Contracting Parties as the boundary between Eritrea and
Ethiopia. Art. II.-The Italian Government binds itself not to cede or sell to any other
Power the territory comprised between the Line Tomat, Todlue, Mareb-Mai, AmbessaMai, Feccia-Mai, Maretta-Mai, HaMahio, Piano galine Faraone, and the line Tomat,
Todluc, Mareb, Belesa, Muna, left by His Majesty Menelik II, King of King of
Ethiopia, to Italy. What would be the legal significance of Article II to peace treaty with
Italy after the Second World War?
The 1902 treaty is a modification of the 1900 Treaty that gave more land to Italy in the North
West of the frontier of Ethiopia. The 1908 Treaty officially and legally made Ethiopia
Completely land locked Article I:
From the most easterly point of the frontier established between the Colony of Eritrea
and the Tigre by the Treaty of the 10th July, 1900, the boundary continues south-east,
parallel to and at a distance of 60 kilometers from the coast, until it joins the frontier of
the French possessions of Somalia.66
There are some Ethiopians who argue that these treaties were void abinitio, asserting that
their were made under duress, alleging that Britain, France and Italy were conspiring to handover
Ethiopia to Italy and that Italy was preparing another invasion and that the treaties were signed
under such coercive pressure. But many treaties were made through the use of military force
during that period. Use of military force to induce or force a state to sign treaty was not
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considered unlawful. Before international law prohibited the use of force in international
relations, territorial changes often came about by virtue of conquest. A policy not to recognize
the validity of territorial acquisitions brought about by force was adopted after the KelloggBriand Pact.67
For what ever compelling circumstances the Emperor might have had, or calculations that
he might have made, the hero of the famous Battle of Adwa that signaled the downfall of
European colonialism had to lose at the negotiation table.68 It is difficult to prove that Ethiopia
signed the treaties under duress. Even if it was signed under duress, it was not unlawful at that
time and non retroactivity of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties forbids its
applications in such circumstances.69 The argument that the treaties were void abinitio in both
cases cannot hold water.
Invasion of Ethiopia by Italy as the Grounds to Render the Treaties Null and Void Treaties
Signed in the 1900s
Ethiopia’s repeated call to demarcate the boundary according to the treaties of 1900,
1902, and 1908 fell in deaf ears in Italy. It, in fact made some military advances in different
areas. Italy was not ready to implement the treaties in good faith. Italy’s bad faith culminated in
its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Italy not only invaded Ethiopia but rearranged the boundaries of
Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia to form the colony of Italian East Africa. Boundaries of the new
administrative units did not follow the previous Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia or the
international boundaries of Ethiopia as they existed before the Italian conquest. Tigray of
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northern Ethiopia was included in the government of Eritrea and the Ogaden of south east of
Ethiopia was made part of Somalia. Italian East Africa had five units, Somalia, Galla-Sidamo,
Harar, and Eritrea.70By this flagrant decision, Italy wanted to dissolve Ethiopia as a nation and
put the name in historical archives.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties71 was largely declaratory of customary
international law72 Article 60 on termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a
consequence of its breach, as a material breach of the treaty is a rule of customary international
law. Under the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47, the Court treated the rules laid
down in Article 60(3), concerning termination on account of breach as a codification of existing
customary law.73 In the cases concerning a ‘material’ breach of a bilateral treaty by one party
entitles the other to invoke it as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending operation in
whole or in part Article 60 (3) defines material breach it as: “
a) Repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the convention; or
b) The violation of a provision ‘essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of
the treaty”
Territorial treaties are relatively consummated transactions like the conveyance of a
territory, leases and servitudes and other agreements that have already been performed in whole
or in part, also compliance is negative, thus consisting primarily of refraining from action and
perhaps not requiring continuous positive action. Rights from these kinds of treaties are
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“earned,” “acquired,” or “real” rights and are meant to be relatively permanent because unilateral
termination is unlawful.74 Unilateral termination of the treaty usually cannot be made without a
resort by the claimant party to an overt act of coercion. How ever, according to general principle
[i.e. customary international law] of law that a right of termination on account of breach must be
presumed to exist in respect to all treaties, except regarding provisions relating to the protection
of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character.75
The object and purpose of territorial treaties is the recognition by ‘neighboring’ states of
the party’s sphere of full control as a matter of asserting its sovereignty and the mutual
recognition of the existence of two sovereign states. The invasion and fragmentation of Ethiopia
is a process of erasing the conditions of Statehood. Treaties cannot exist with out the existence of
one party. As far as Italy was concerned Ethiopia did not exist from 1935 on wards.
Italy breached the boundary treaty with Ethiopia by invading and occupying Ethiopia.
Off course the breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties does not ipso facto put an end to
the treaty, but only entitles the other party to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the
treaty or suspending its operations. This has been accepted as customary international law.76
Accordingly, Emperor Haile Selassie, by declaration and by the adoption of the Eritrean
Constitution and the ratification of the Federal Act in 1952 made the 1900, 1902, and 1908
conventions between Ethiopia and Italy null and void.77 The Emperor’s declaration of null and
void may be taken as a wise legal precautionary arrangement, since the treaties of 1900, 1902,
and 1908 were made obsolete pursuant to the Paris Peace Conference of 1947 and the Resolution
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of the United Nations General Assembly. Italy renounced its rights to its colonial territories and
the “successors” of these rights, i.e. the Victorious Four Powers, upon the recommendation of
the United Nations General Assembly, decided to federate Eritrea to Ethiopia, there by
effectively extinguished the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties.
Customary international law is a law that derives from the practice of states and is
accepted by them as legally binding.78 The principle of material breach of a treaty and the right
of the party which is upholding its obligation in good faith to deem the treaty null and void has
been established by state practice. These practices can be described in many instances in the
modern world in different treaties. Most treaties can be breached by action or omission of
obligations and are usually time bounded. Territorial treaties are meant to be permanent and can
only be breached by action usually accompanied by force as discussed above. The Munich
Agreement and Riga Treaty represent contemporary states practice that reflects the customary
law that may invoke a material breach to declare a territorial treaty null and void.
The Munich Agreement
On September 29, 1938, in Munich Germany, France, Italy, Germany, and the United
Kingdom signed an agreement regarding the cession to Germany from Czechoslovakia of the
territory known as the Sudetenland.79The agreement was made to avert the Second World War
and give an international guarantee for the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakian state against
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un provoked aggression.80 But Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and took over the rest of the
country at the beginning of the war.
In announcing that the United Kingdom did not bind itself to continue to accept the
transfer of the Sudetenland Land to Germany according to the Munich Agreement, the Prime
Minister declared that:
….as Germany has deliberately destroyed the arrangements, concerning Czechoslovakia,
reached in 1938 in which His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom participated,
His Majesty’s Government regard themselves as free from any engagements in this
respect. At the final settlement of Czechoslovakia frontiers to be reached at the end of the
war, they will not be influenced by any changes affected in and since 1938.81
Similarly, President of the French National Committee Charles de Gaulle wrote a letter to the
Czechoslovakian Prime Minister on September 29, 1942 stating that:
In this spirit the French National Committee, rejecting the agreements signed in Munich
on September 29, 1938, solemnly declare that they consider these agreements as null and
void as also all acts accomplished in the application or in consequence of these same
agreements. Recognizing no territorial alternations affecting Czechoslovakia supervening
in 1938 or since that time, they undertake to do everything in their power to ensure that
the Czechoslovak Republic within frontiers prior to September 1938, obtains all effective
guarantees for her military and economic security, her territorial integrity and her
political unity.82
In June, 1945, the Victorious Four Powers also implicitly treated the Munich Agreement
as null and void by declaring that Germany, with her frontiers as they were on December,
311937, would for the purposes of occupation, be divided into four zones, one to be allocated to
each power.83
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The Riga Treaty of 1921
The USSR was in a difficult position after the October Revolution and the War with
Poland. Due to its military setbacks, the Soviets Union with resentment offered the Polish peace
delegation substantial territorial concessions in the contested border areas. It did so under the
Riga Treaty of 1921 to get some respite. Lenin said that while a few weeks earlier the Riga
Conference has gone through crises, “we decided to make some more concessions, not because
we thought them just but because we considered it important to smash the intrigue” of White
Guardists and the entente.84
The USSR unilaterally terminated the Riga Treaty and on September 28, 1939, concluded
a Frontier and Friendship Treaty with Germany in “recognition of the collapse of the former
Polish state.”85 They agreed in Article I to partition and determine boundary of their respective
interests in the territory of the “former” Polish state.86
On June 22, 1941, German military forces invaded the Soviet Union. On July 30, 1941,
the Soviet Union and Poland signed an agreement as to war against Germany. Article 1 states
that:
The Government of the USSR recognizes the Soviet- German treaties of 1939 as to the
territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity. The Polish Government
declares Poland is not bound by any agreement with any third power which is directed
against the USSR.87
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The USSR signed the Riga Treaty of 1921, unilaterally terminated it by signing a treaty
with Germany, which divided Poland between them. The USSR declared null and void the
territorial treaty with Germany when it was invaded by the same. The USSR re- installed the
Riga Treaty by signing another treaty with Poland as cited above. Later, however, the USSR
concluded an agreement with the United States, and the United Kingdom, which Poland was
made to endorse, declaring the re-installed Riga Treaty null and void. The United Kingdom
proposed the Curzon line, which the Soviet Union claimed, as a boundary between the USSR
and Poland, by invalidating the Riga Treaty of 1921. On January 11, 1944, the USSR as a
justification of the occupation and its demand for new frontier declared that: “… The injustice
committed by the Riga Treaty of 1921, which was imposed upon the Soviet Union, in regard of
the Ukrainians inhabiting the western Ukraine and the Byelorussians inhabiting Western
Byelorussia, was that rectified”.88 United Kingdom and the USSR agreed that Poland should
obtain equal compensation in the West from Germany including Eastern Prussia and frontiers on
the Oder to compensate for the areas which would be in the Soviet Union.89
In discussing how the invalidation of a territorial treaty was justified Steven R, Ratner
has stated:
Despite pleas from the Polish government in London, the U.S. and British governments
were prepared to meet Stalin’s demands. But what about the Riga Treaty—how could it
be changed without Poland’s consent? Again, the parties invoked international law to
defend their solution. Though Eden principally argued to a skeptical House of Commons
in terms of justice and stability of the modified Curzon line, he also emphasized that
Poland had violated the post—world war minority treaty regarding Eastern Galicia; he
added that the UK had never guaranteed Poland’s1939 frontiers, implying that Britain
was legally free to endorse a new line that took significant territory away from the
Poland. For good measure, however, the Allied agreed at Yalta that the ‘opinion’ of the
new Polish government would be “sought in due course” and that the final decision
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would await a peace conference, that is, be confirmed by treaty. A treaty was made that
guaranteed the USSR Occupation.90

Conclusion
Germany was offered some territories of Czechoslovakia to avoid war, and maintain
peace and stability. But as discussed above, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and breached the
Munich Agreement. After the war the four powers by explicitly declaring that Germany
destroyed the Munich Agreement and implicitly making territorial arrangements made the treaty
null and void. The British Foreign Minister had to invoke international law to ignore the Riga
Treaty of 1921 and recognize the territories occupied by the USSR to be take away from Poland
because, ‘Poland had violated the post- world war minority treaty regarding Eastern Galicia.
The contemporary practices of the major powers re enforce the customary law and make
it clearer why Ethiopia had the right to invoke material breach and declare null and void the
treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 after Italy invaded and occupied Ethiopia in 1935. The above
examples make Ethiopia’s case clearer because of the flagrant invasion and occupation by Italy
of the whole country despite the treaties of the first decade of the last century.
The attempts to compromise territorial rights to avoid war, and maintain peace and
stability during the Second World War, the role of force in making new territorial arrangements
after the war and flexibility exhibited according to circumstances for a greater policy objective
are also some of the lessons that can be drawn from these practices and which will be discussed
latter.
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CHAPTER 4
REVOLUTION 390 V OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS
THE FOUNDATION FOR THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BETWEEN ETHIOPIA
AND ERITREA
Ethiopia’s Claim to Access to the Sea
After Italy renounced its rights and title on its colonial territories, no other country had
superior right than Ethiopia’s in case of disposition of Eritrea. As mention above the treaties of
the 1900,s had a provision that asserted that Italy could not transfer to any other state the
territories that were referred to in the treaty. In other words Italy was under an obligation to hand
over the territories back to Ethiopia in case it wanted to dispense with the territories. Given the of
Ethiopia’s prior right and the historical, cultural and ethnic relationships of south and south east
of Eritrea with Ethiopia, and the legitimate need to have an outlet to the sea, Ethiopia was in a
better position than any country to claim an out late to the sea.
Ethiopia first asserted its claim to an outlet to the sea before the World War II was over.
In 1940 when Haile Selassie realized that Britain would sponsor his return to Ethiopia, he had
begun a campaign to have Eritrea placed under Addis Abeba’s sovereignty.91 Great Britain’s
official position was that this matter can only properly be considered at the peace settlement.92
On 13 February 1945 Emperor Haile Selassie met President Roosevelt of the United
States in Cairo after the Yalta Conference.93 The Emperor outlined Ethiopia’s major concerns,
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where were substantially detailed in five memoranda handed to Roosevelt .94 Concerning the
memoranda, Marcus writes that:
The first reflected Ethiopia’s continuing dismay with Paris’s refusal in 1935-1936, to
permit arms to be shipped via the Franco-Ethiopian railway to Addis Abeba,
“notwithstanding the fact that by virtue of Article II of the [rail way] concession [of 30
January 1908] the railway was to be placed in time of war at the disposal of the Ethiopian
Government.” This denial of rights “was clearly one of the most important factors leading
to the defeat of 1936” and amounted to abrogating the concession…
Even with complete control of the railroad, Ethiopia remained landlocked, a condition
which the second memorandum sought to remedy. Addis Abeba explained that it had
never recognized the validity of the 19th-century, inter- European treaties which had
parcelled out Ethiopia’s Red Sea littoral, even if forced to enter “certain bilateral
agreements concerning these territories.” With out its ports, Ethiopia had suffered
indirect control by the adjacent colonial powers, the best case in point being France’s
refusal to permit arms shipments from Djibouti. “Apart from the use of poison gases, it is
clear that the immediate and most powerful cause for the defeat of…1936 was the
political control exercised over the Franco-Ethiopian Railway.” Logically therefore,
Ethiopia’s isolation from the sea was the real antecedent of fascist occupation.95
The emperor sent Yilma Deressa a vice- minister in his government to the United States
in June of 1943 to demand assistance in different field one of which was the issue of access to
the sea. Yilma’s reference to Ethiopia’s need for an outlet to the sea was also heard with
equanimity by the United States.96 The office of the US Secretary of State was of the opinion that
a fairly strong case could be made in support of the Ethiopian contention that Eritrea, or a part of
it, should be incorporated into Ethiopia.97
Led by the then Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habtewold,
Ethiopia had consistently fought for its right to access to the sea, during the Paris Peace
Conference and after, in all important forums until Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia. Professor
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Techola Hagos has written about Ethiopia’s struggle and the role of Aklilu Habtewold and said
that:
Italy vehemently fought to have Ethiopia excluded from the process by mounting a
campaign of misinformation, and possible corruption. It was the great skill and tenacity
of the young international law lawyer, Aklilu Habtewold, that convinced France (hostile
to Ethiopia), Britain (with conflict of interest, ambition to carve out an East Africa
dominion), the Soviet Socialist Republic (against the interest of Ethiopia, with acute
reservation as to the role of Emperor Haile Selassie), and the United States (very
supportive with new strategy for the area in its mind) government representatives the
justice of including Ethiopia in the Peace Treaty.98
Ethiopia learned the importance of the outlet to the sea in the hardest way for there is
nothing more important for a state to lose than its sovereignty. That is why Ethiopians started the
issue of access to the sea before the World War ended. The conspiracy of the major powers that
surrounded Ethiopia, in allowing and recognizing Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia which was a
member of the League of Nations is a reminder to the existing generation what landlocked my
mean when surrounded by hostile surroundings.99
The Proposals of the Victories Four Powers of the Second World War Regarding the Disposition
of Eritrea
Since 1942 the issue of Italian colonies in Africa has been considered by the Allied
Powers since 1942. The fate of the colonies was jointly discussed on July 22, 1945, during the
six plenary meetings of the Potsdam Conference100 and on August 2, 1945, the leaders of Britain,
U.S.A, and USSR reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers
representing China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
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Republics, to consider the disposal of the Italian colonies among other very wide issues of peace
and security.101 On July 15, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes reported the progress which had
been made by the Council of Foreign Ministers at the second part of its Paris meeting:
No final decision was reached on the disposition of the Italian colonies …If the
Four principal Allied Powers do not agree upon the disposition to be made of the colonies
within a year after the coming into force of the treaty, they have bound themselves to
make such disposition of them as may be recommended by he General Assembly of the
United Nations.102

The four powers had diverse positions regarding the disposition of Eritrea each reflecting
different strategic motives. Common to all was the right of Ethiopia to access to the sea. All of
them recognized this historical right (USSR had not pronounced it for a “tactical period” as will
be explained later). Even Italy had to acknowledge the right. Just prior to the opening of the first
session of the Council of the Foreign Ministers at London, the Italian foreign minister wrote to
his U.S. counter part that:
[i]f even for Somaliland a trusteeship system could be discussed, in our old colony of
Eritrea the maintenance of Italian sovereignty is essential. This is fully reconcilable with
Ethiopia’s requirement for a free outlet to the sea, for which purpose Italy has built the
road leading from Dessie to Assab. This access could be guaranteed either within Italian
territory or, if requested, through frontier rectifications. Furthermore, to meet the
legitimate requirements of the northern Abyssinian regions, a free zone could be
established at Massaua.103
To conclude the war with some of the countries a conference was convened usually
referred as the “Paris Peace Conference”. The conference adopted a set of peace treaties with
Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. The Treaty of Peace with Italy, which was
signed on February 10, 1947, provided among other things “Italy renounces all right and title to
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the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.” in
article23 (1) of section IV and Article 23(3), of the Treaty gave the mandate for the final
disposition of the territories to France, Britain, the U.S.A and the USSR China was omitted. The
four powers in a joint declaration (Annex XI) announced that they will determine the final
disposition of Italy’s territorial possessions in Africa within a year and that the Deputies of the
Foreign Ministers should continue to consider the question of disposal and submit their
recommendation to the Council of Foreign Ministers. They also declared that in case of
disagreement among the four powers, the matter should be referred to the General Assembly of
the United Nations for a recommendation. They agreed to abide by the General Assembly’s
recommendation and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it.104
The renouncement by Italy of its rights and titles, pursuant to Article 23(1) of the Treaty
of Peace with Italy brought the treaty between Ethiopia and Italy to an end, because the rights
and titles of Italy were transferred to the Victorious Four Powers by the same treaty. A new legal
regime started to develop to govern the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The
‘Successors’ of Italy regarding its colonies i.e., the Four Powers were meant to negotiate and
provide the means of disposition of the said colonies. But they could not agree on a common
disposition. On August 31, 1948 the Deputies of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers described
their respective countries position as follows:
USSR
“[That the former Italian Colony of Eritrea be placed under the trusteeship of

Italy for

a definite acceptable term”. According to Daniel Kindie the USSR had different calculations to
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promote its positions one of which was that the USSR was trying to influence the outcome of the
Italian elections in favor of the Communist Party of Italy. He declares that the USSR abandoned
its position after the Communist party lost the election and proposed that the former Italian
colonies be under the United Nations Trusteeship system and that a territorial concession be
made in favor of Ethiopia, so that it obtains access to the sea through the port of Assab. 105
U.K.
“[1] Ethiopia should be appointed to be the administering authority in Eritrea for a period
of ten years. “[2) At the end of ten years the General Assembly of the United Nations
would decide whether, and if so under what conditions Ethiopian administration should
continue in definitely.” “[3) An advisory Council would be appointed to assist the
Ethiopian Administration. This Council would consist of local Eritreans and the
representatives of four Powers, for instance, Italy Switzerland, a Scandinavian country
and a Moslem State]”
France
“[1) With the exception of the territories situated between the Gulf of Zula and French
Somaliland, Eritrea should be placed under the trusteeship of Italy. “[2) The territories
situated between the Gulf of Zula and French Somaliland should be assigned to Ethiopia
in full sovereignty.” “[3) The frontier between the territories assigned to Ethiopia and
those which would be placed under the trusteeship of Italy should follow the present
eastern administrative limit of the district of Akkele Guzai from the Gulf of Zula to the
present Ethiopian Frontier. It should be demarcated by a composition composed of an
equal number of Ethiopians and Italian representatives before the 15th of September,
1949.]
U.S.
“[The United States recommends the cession to Ethiopia of the southern section of
Eritrea (including the Danakil Coast, and the districts of Akkele Guzai and Serai, the new
frontier to start at the Gulf of Zula, following the northern borders Akkele Guzai and Serai
Districts to the Ethiopian frontier.
“the United States further proposes that the Foreign Ministers recommend to the
General Assembly of the United Nations that the question of the disposition of the remainder of
Eritrea, that is, the northern and predominantly Moslem portion including Asmara and Massawa,
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be postponed for one year in order that it may be given further study before attempting to come
to a definite solution.]
U.K. U.S. and France
“[The frontier between the territories assigned to Ethiopia and French Somaliland
should follow the course of the Wadi Weima.]106
The Deputies had sent a Commission to Eritrea to collect necessary data and ascertain the
views of the local population. The Commission submitted its recommendation on …... The
deputies after studying the report of the Commission and consulting interested governments
completed their recommendations, which were not unanimous. Having failed to reach agreement,
the Four Powers, submitted the question to the General Assembly according to the terms of the
Treaty of Peace with Italy.107
The Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and the Federation
The First Committee of the General Assembly took the task of making a recommendation
regarding the disposition of Eritrea and the other Italian colonies. The committee adopted the
Bevin Sforza formula and presented it during the second part of the third regular session in April
1949. According to the formula, Eritrea, subject to the guarantees for its minority, Eritrea was to
be incorporated into Ethiopia except for the Western Province which was to be handed over to
the Sudan.108 But annexation of the Western Province by the Sudan was defeated by the Latin
American and Soviet blocs.109 This part of the formula on Eritrea was, therefore, left in blank
when the vote came on the entire resolution.110 But, the proposal as a whole was rejected by the
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General Assembly due to the failure to obtain a two-thirds majority in favor of either Libya or
Somaliland.111
At its Fourth regular session the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
Resolution 289 A (IV) on November 21, 1949, established a commission made up of Burma,
Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa due to the fact that the available
information was considered insufficient by several delegates.112. The commission’s task was to
investigate and make proposal or proposals according to the terms of reference given by the
Assembly. The terms of reference were:
(a) The wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea including the views of the various
racial, religious and political groups of the provinces of the territory and the capacity of
the people for self-government
(b) The interests of peace and security in East Africa
(c) The rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historic, ethnic and
economic reasons including in particular Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access
to the sea.113
From 10 January 1950 up to 8 June 1950 the commission held seventy meetings of which
forty were public.114 It collected information from representatives of the population of the
territory, including minorities, and had consultations with the government of the United
Kingdom Egypt, Ethiopia, France, and Italy.115
The UN commission, like the earlier four powers commission of investigation could not
come to agreement on the factual review of the problems of Eritrea or on recommendation of
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solutions.116Thus circumstances forced it to submit two sets of factual findings and
recommended solutions.117 The delegation of Burma, Norway, and Union of South Africa agreed
on the factual findings and supported similar solutions with some differences.118 Three of them
proposed that, given the commission’s terms of references independence for Eritrea was not a
solution: instead close political association with Ethiopia represented the fair and lasting
solution. Norway suggested that Ethiopia should be allowed to adopt the constitutional
provisions which best suited the conditions in this part of Africa and proposed that the whole
territory of Eritrea be reunited to Ethiopia and that the Western Province could provisionally
and for a limited period of time be left under the present British Administration.119 Burma and
Union of South Africa proposed that Eritrea should not be partitioned and that there should be a
federal government of Ethiopia and Eritrea.120The delegations of Guatemala and Pakistan
concluded that the majority of the inhabitant of Eritrea wished to be independent and proposed
that the best solution for the future of Eritrea was independence, following direct trusteeship by
the United Nations for a maximum period of ten years.121
In its resolution 390 A (V) the United Nations General Assembly based on the report of
the Interim Committee of the General Assembly on the Report of the United Nations
Commission For Eritrea recommended that Eritrea should constitute an autonomous unit
federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown and enumerated the basic
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tenets of the Federation.122 It elected Mr. Eduardo Anze Matienzo to the office of United
Nations Commissioner in Eritrea123 and welcomed the establishment of the Federation of Eritrea
with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown in its 404th plenary meeting on 17
December1952.124
Every country that participated in the decision making regarding the disposition of Eritrea
took a position on the status of the country according to its ideological and religious affiliations
and the effect on its assumed national interests in the region. The United States was concerned
about the communications and intelligence installations in Eritrea and thought that a satisfied
Ethiopia might play an important role in the defense of the Middle East.125 The USSR wanted to
participate in the trusteeship process, minimize the western influence in the area, and support the
Italian communist party in the elections at the expense of the region. France wanted to minimize
the influence of the United Kingdom and create balance of forces by trying to reinstate Italy. The
United Kingdom wanted the Western province of Eritrea under its influence.126 Members of the
Commission of Eritrea seem to have read the facts and to have provided recommendations based
on their affiliations to the Four Powers, and on their religion and other ideological relationships.
But note should be taken about the position of the minority, i.e., Guatemala and Pakistan which
totally ignored the third point of the terms of reference namely, “The rights and claims of
Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons, including in particular
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Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea”.127 The Memorandum submitted by
the delegation of Guatemala and Pakistan argued that:
It has often been repeated that Ethiopia needs the control of Eritrean territory for reasons
of security against possible aggression from outside. Such possibility does not exist. The
surrounding countries, such as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the countries of the other side
of the read sea, and the neighboring colonial territories administered by France and the
United Kingdom, as well as former Italian Somali Land, which is now under the
International Trusteeship system of the United Nations, do not present any danger to the
peace of Ethiopia, nor, in general, to the peace and security of that area of the world.”128
The argument of Guatemala and Pakistan on the peace and security in East Africa was
ridiculous and did not reflect the then existing geopolitics of the region. Italy used Eritrea as
spring board to invade Ethiopia in 1896 and in 1935. This delegation might not have been aware
of the Battle of Adwa in 1896, but it could not forget the invasion and occupation of Ethiopia
from Eritrea during the Second World War which was the cause for the formation of the
Commission for Eritrea. Egypt had repeatedly attempted to conquer Ethiopia in the second half
of 19 century following Werner Munzinger advice” It believed that Ethiopia with a disciplined
administration and army, and European allies, was a danger to Egypt which Egypt must either
take over and Islamize or retain in anarchy and misery.”129 The Geo- Politics of the Red Sea
and the attitude of Moslems countries including Turkey towards Ethiopia as a ‘Christian island’
was a clear signal to danger of the security of the region. The argument of the delegation of
Guatemala and Pakistan was also ‘short sighted’ when it guaranteed Ethiopia’s security on the
then existing Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the countries of the other side of the read sea, and the
neighboring colonial territories administered by France and the United Kingdom, as well as
former Italian Somali Land, as if the colonial powers and the trusteeship would last long
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The Main Objective and Purpose of the “Treaty of Four Powers and Ethiopia” Regarding the
Federation of Eritrea to Ethiopia was the Security and Right to Access to the Sea of Ethiopia

The fact that Eritrea has seceded from Ethiopia and has become an independent state
brings a new relationship. This relationship, between two sovereign countries created different
disputes, including in particular territorial disputes. As discussed in Chapter 3 the treaties of
1900, 1902, and 1908, were declared null and void by Ethiopia on the bases of the material
breach by Italy. Beyond that and before Ethiopia declared the treaty null and void, Italy
renounced its rights over Eritrea when it signed the peace Treaty as the end of the World War II.
The ‘successors’ of Italy i.e., the Victorious Four Powers created a new ‘treaty’ with Ethiopia,
when they accepted Resolution 390 V of the United Nations General Assembly that federated
Eritrea to Ethiopia. Although it may not be the standard treaty but it has all the characteristics of
a treaty. In a similar situation Sir Jennings states that, in the ICJ case concerning the status of
South West Africa that the provisions of the Mandate for South West Africa- which was in the
nature of a treaty between the Council of the League of Nations and South Africa –were not
decisively affected by the fact that the League had ceased to exist.130 The League of Nations
conferred the Mandate over South West Africa to the Union of South Africa. The Territory was
placed under a “C” mandate which permitted South Africa to administer it as an integral part of
the Union.131 Similarly the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended that Eritrea
should constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the
Ethiopian Crown and Eritrea was made part of Ethiopia governed by the “federal Ethiopian
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laws”. The Eritrean Constitution and the “Federal Act” were negotiated between the UN
Commissioner of Eritrea and the Ethiopian government and were ratified by the Emperor and
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1952. That is why the
recommendation of the General Assembly and the acceptance of that recommendation by
Ethiopia have all the characteristics of a treaty. The Victorious Four Power delegated the United
Nations General Assembly to recommend a solution for the disposition of Eritrea, and its
recommendation on the disposition of Eritrea was in essence a treaty between Ethiopia and the
Victorious Four Powers.
The Ethiopia- Eritrea case is not as complex as the Israel- Palestinian case. But the role of
the General Assembly of the United Nations is similar in establishing legal relationships based
on the delegation of Mandatory Power which serves as a basis for future dispute resolution
appear to be similar.
The territory of Palestine was administered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate
received in 1922 from the League of Nations.132 Among the issues that had to be dealt with by
the Mandatory Power was the question of a Jewish home in Palestine. Increasing Jewish
immigration to Palestine following the Second World War was strongly opposed by the Arab
inhabitants, who in the mid-1940s comprised about two thirds of the territory’s population of two
million. Faced with escalating violence, the United Kingdom decided, in February 1947, to bring
the question of Palestine before the United Nations.133
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At the special session, the Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee
on Palestine (UNSCOP), made up of 11 Member States, to investigate all questions relevant to
the problem of Palestine and to recommend solutions to be considered by the General Assembly
at the regular session in September 1947 UNSCOP completed its work on 31 August 1947, with
the members agreeing on the question of terminating the Mandate, the principle of independence
and the role of the United Nations.134
There was no consensus, however, on a settlement of the question of Palestine. The
majority of the members of the Committee recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an
Arab State and a Jewish State, with a special international status for the city of Jerusalem under
the administrative authority of the United Nations. At its second regular session, after an intense
two-month-long debate, the General Assembly, on 29 November 1947, adopted resolution 181
(II), approving with minor changes the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as proposed by
the majority in the Special Committee on Palestine.135
Meanwhile, on 11 May 1949, Israel became a Member of the United Nations. In
admitting Israel, the General Assembly specifically took note of Israel’s declarations and
explanations made earlier to the Assembly’s Ad Hoc Political Committee regarding the
implementation of resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III). Those declarations and explanations
referred, among other things, to the international regime envisaged for Jerusalem, the problem of
Arab refugees and boundary questions.136
Since Resolution 181(II) there were three major wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973 between
Israel and its Arab Neighbors. There have also been continuous non conventional armed conflicts
134
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in Israel, Palestinian Territories and outside the region between the Palestinians and Israel. There
have been numerous resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Security
Council of the United Nations.137
Israel had made peace with some Arab nations and has recognized a Palestinian State in
the future in exchange for recognition by the Palestinian Authority of the right of Israel to exist
as a state. Although Resolution 181(II) could be the bases for dispute settlement between Israel
and Palestinian Authority, there has been so much dramatic change and development since the
resolution that international law has to recognize these developments when peaceful solutions are
sought for.
Resolution 390 V became the governing legal regime to all relationships when Eritrea
was federated with Ethiopia. “The agreement of marriage should be the basis for dispute
settlement between the parties when the marriage is dissolved by divorce”.138 Eritrea which
seceded from Ethiopia is now a recognized member of the United Nations. When Eritrea got its
independence in 1993 the issue of territories was not raised and was in suspension when the war
started in 1998 and is still not solved. In fact as described on the chapter on background, Ethiopia
and Eritrea are in a state of “no peace no war” and no one knows where the situation might lead.
The “agreement of marriage”= in this case the law that made Eritrea an autonomous unit
federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown= should be the point of
reference and the basis to resolve any territorial disputes. The resolution should be interpreted
according to international law in general and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in
particular.
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Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that: “[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” The basic principles
embodied in article 31(1) are the principles of good faith, ordinary meaning, context, and object
and purpose. Article 31 and 32 of the convention were adopted virtually with out change by the
conference and are generally considered to reflect customary international law.139

Malcolm

Shaw asserts that these principles are interrelated and applied the same:
There are three basic approaches to treaty interpretation. The first centers on the actual
text of the agreement and emphasizes the analysis of the word used. The second looks to
the intention of the parties adopting the agreement as the solution to ambiguous
provisions and can be termed the subjective approach in contradistinction to the objective
approach of the previous schools. The third approach adopts a wider perspective than the
other two and emphasizes the object and purpose of the treaty as the most important
backcloth against which the meaning of any particular treaty should be measured.
Nevertheless, any true interpretation of a treaty in international law will have to take into
account all aspects of the agreement, from the words employed to the intention of the
parties and the aims of particular documents. It is not possible to exclude completely any
one of the components.140
Although all aspects of the agreement will have to be taken into account, the process of
interpretation must begin with the analysis of the ordinary meaning of specific provisions of the
treaty concerning the question in dispute.141 The contention in this case is whether Eritrea should
secede with the territorial boundary that it had before the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy which was
made by the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties or whether that boundary should be modified
according to Resolution 390 V. When Ethiopia incorporated Eritrea in 1952, the international
boundary between Italian Eritrea and Ethiopia became “internalized” while the boundaries
common to Eritrea on the other hand, and French Somali Land and the Sudan, on the other hand,
139
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remained unaffected.142 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties between
Ethiopia, and Italy had been declared null and void by Ethiopia because, of the breach of the
treaties by Italy when it invaded Ethiopia. Moreover, the successors of the colonial rights of
Italy, i.e. the Victorious Four Powers had replaced and made irrelevant the 1900s treaties of
Ethiopia and Italy, when they accepted the recommendation of the General Assembly of the
United Nations to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia.
The operative provisions of Resolution 390 V are, Article A (1), Eritrea shall constitute
an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown and
Article A (2), which states that the Eritrean government shall posses legislative, executive and
judicial powers in the field of domestic affairs. Other provisions are based on the above
provisions and are standard clauses of federalism and human rights. Schwarzenberger asserts that
judicial institutions have pronounced treaty clauses as 'Clear' as having in their context as a
natural' or 'ordinary' meaning and cites the ICJ on the Advisory Opinion on the Competence of
the UN Assembly regarding admission to the united nation (1950) that the
[f] irst duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provision of the
treaty, is to endeavourer to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in
the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary
meaning make sense in their context that is an end to the matter.143
There is no specific language regarding the territorial boundaries of the ‘units’ in the UN
General Assembly Resolution. From these two provisions it is difficult to formulate how the
resolution directs in case of secession by Eritrea. The resolution itself didn’t envisage secession.
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In fact it is an instrument of unity which federated a former colony of Italy to Ethiopia. The
ordinary meaning doesn't mean the meaning to be given from the context of understanding at the
time of interpretation but the meaning of the terms at the time the treaty was concluded. This is
termed as the principle of contemporarily by Fitzmaurice and is a particular application of the
doctrine of inters- temporal law.144 In the case concerning the arbitral award of 31 July 1989, the
tribunal noted that a treaty ' must be interpreted in the light in force at the date of its
conclusion.145 However there are some jurists who claim that ' a treaty... acquires a life of its
own. Consequently in interpreting it we must have regard to the exigencies of contemporary life,
rather than the intentions of those who framed it.146

So, how is the Resolution of 1950 to be

interpreted in different circumstances in the first decade of the 21 century?
It would be advisable to look at other principles of interpretation for international
jurisprudence illustrates the necessity to go beyond a purely grammatical or linguistic
interpretation of a particular work or phrase.147 Of course principles of international law or
customary international law like Uti Possidetis, and equity,

may be utilized in the absence of

solutions from the principles of treaty interpretation. If the ordinary meanings of the operative
provisions do not resolve the dispute, the contextual approach should continue to search for the
correct interpretation or conform the ordinary meaning in the operative provisions.
Article 31(2) Defines context as:
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text including its preamble and annexes. a) Any agreement relating
to the treaty, which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty. b) Any instrument, which was made by one or more
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parties in connection with the conclusion or the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
According to article 31(2), in order to appreciate the context of a treaty the text of the treaty is
the most important document. The text should be read as a whole. Simply concentrating on a
paragraph an article a section, a chapter or a part will not allow one to comprehend the whole
context.
Resorting to some matters extrinsic to the terms of the treaty, according to O'Connell, one
of which is the preamble, where available, is the place where the general statements about the
object and purpose of the treaty are stated it is the natural place to expound the principal object to
the treaty and Sinclair cites Fitzmaurice in saying that
Although the objects of a treaty may be gathered from its operative clauses taken as a
whole the preamble is the normal place in which to embody and to look for, an express or
explicit general statement of the treaty is objects and purposes where these are stated in
the preamble, the later will, to that extent govern the whole treaty.148
Although it is very difficult to deduce specific obligation from a statement or purpose
from a preamble international tribunals have not hesitated to refer to it in order to discover the
object. The agricultural labor and production case, United States nationals in Morocco case, and
the Ambatielo case are some of cases where the purpose and object of the treaty were looked for
in the preamble.149
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The ‘preamble’ of Resolution 390 V states:

[t]aking into the consideration
(a) The wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea including the views of the
various racial, religious and political groups of the provinces of the territory and
the capacity of the people for self-government
(b) The interests of peace and security in East Africa
(c) The rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historic, ethnic and
economic reasons including in particular Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate
access to the sea
Taking into account the importance of assuring the continuing collaboration of the
foreign communities in the economic development of Eritrea
Recognizing that the disposal of Eritrea should be based on its close political and
economic association with Ethiopia, and
Desiring that this association assure to the habitants of Eritrea the fullest respect
and safe guards for their institutions, traditions, religions and languages, as well
as the widest possible measure of self-government, while at the same time
respecting the Constitution, institutions, traditions and the international status and
identity of the Empire of Ethiopia.150
Preliminary conclusion must be tested in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.
As mentioned above the cardinal and the first technique of interpretation is to look for the
“Ordinary meaning” to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context. If the ordinary
meaning cannot give sense or becomes unrealistic or absurd, and needs to be verified as a solid
conclusion, then it had to be verified through / with the conformity of the object and purpose of
the treaty.
There cannot be a treaty without an object and purpose. The assumption that most treaties
have one and clear object and purpose is always to be questioned for most treaties might have
many different objects and purposes and might have been constructed in a vague manner and
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some times conflicting objects and purposes. Sinclair in his book of Vienna convention asserts
that " [a] number of a authors consider that the search for the object and purpose of a treaty is in
reality a search for common intentions of the parties who drew up the treaty”.151 In order to
come to a conclusion about the object and purpose of the resolution it is necessary to analyze the
provisions of the text in light of the preamble, the preparation process and the practice of states
after the Resolution was implemented.
Firstly the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea-- including the views of the
various racial, religious and political groups of the provinces of the territory – were unclear. One
report concluded that only minority favored independence.152The other report found that a
majority were for independence.153 The delegation of Norway in its proposal indicated the
growing opposition to the union by declaring that if Eritrea and Ethiopia, after their liberation
from Italian domination in 1941 had been united together; such a union would have met with no
opposition but as of 1950 there was opposition.154If the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea was
the main reason in the decision of the status of Eritrea, referendum could have been the best
litmus rather than relying on conflicting reports. The representative of Iraq had suggested for
referendum but attention was not given.155 Antonio Cassese wrote:
Where the UN action can be faulted is in its failure to organize a referendum in 1950 to
establish the wishes of Eritreans. Actually, the manner in which the five-member UN
Commission ascertained the will of Eritreans is highly questionable. In short, it seems
that political and strategic considerations took the upper hand, and self-determination-as
the ‘genuine and free expression of will’ of the people—was set aside.156
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The inhabitants of Eritrea were not asked about their wishes by way of referendum. Eritrea’s
political parties had campaigned passionately for union or independence, not one had ever called
for federation.”157

Nevertheless, after months of intense behind-the-scenes negotiations

between the foreign ministers and ambassadors of interested parties158

the United Nations

General Assembly ruled that Eritrea should become ‘an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia
under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.’
It may be difficult to assert that the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea were fully set
aside, but from the fact that the United States, France and the United Kingdom from the
Victorious Four Powers and Italy the former colonial power supported giving Ethiopia an outlet
to the sea with out consulting the inhabitants of the colony of Eritrea, that political and strategic
consideration took the upper hand in the disposition of Eritrea, that no Eritrean Party during that
time ever called for federation, and that compromise was done within the General Assembly of
the United Nations not the inhabitants of Eritrea, one can safely conclude that the right of
Ethiopia to access to the sea was not tied up or dependent on the wishes of the then inhabitants of
Eritrea.
Secondly, federation was not intended to work.
The proposals of the UN commission were submitted to the Interim Committee of the
General Assembly as required and the federation formula as spelled out in the Burmese
proposals served as basis for those behind-the-scenes discussions.159 These talks developed into
indirect negotiations with Italy with the president of the Interim Committee assisted by
157
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Ambassador Padilla Nervo of Mexico, and British and American delegates.160Aklilu the head of
the Ethiopian delegation rejected the Burmese proposal and stated that:
Ethiopia, a sovereign and independent state for hundred of years was not about to
surrender her sovereignty and disappear from the world scene in order to join in a
federation with a territory and population one- twentieth her size which has never known
independence. Unless Ethiopia could retain her historic and international existence there
would be no federation and no solution whatever to the problem of Eritrea. If the attempt
were made to activate the discredited Italian formula of independence, Ethiopia would
consider that her national security was at stake; with Italy already back in Somaliland
even before any trusteeship agreement was in existence, Ethiopia would stop at nothing
to protect herself against a fresh Italian threat from Eritrea.161

The resolution actually ignored the suggestions of the delegation of Burma in agreement
with delegation of the Union of South Africa that the governmental structure of the two states of
Ethiopia and Eritrea should be federal and should consist of a federal government as well as
separate governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, with the Emperor of Ethiopia as constitutional
head.162 It also ignored the legal participation of Eritrea as a unit in law making and the
executive in the federal government163. The recommendation didn’t oblige Ethiopia to amend its
Constitution and rearrange its institutions to fully accommodate the federation except for the
creation of an Imperial Federal Council composed of equal numbers of Ethiopian and Eritrean
representatives who were to meet at least once a year to advice upon the common affairs of the
federation referred to in paragraph 3.164
A democratic system in Eritrea and an autocratic Sovereign was impossible to run. The
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Federation’s very foundations were built on shifting sands.165 The notion of federating the
Western-style democracy Britain had introduced in Eritrea, in which the rights to an independent
press, trade union membership and freedom of association and freedom of religion were
guaranteed, with an ancient empire in which all real power lay in one man’s hands was innately
problematic.166
Spencer, the legal adviser of the Ethiopian delegation notes that during consultation with the
Interim Committee in New York the Ethiopian delegation was privately assured that the
arrangement ‘divested the United Nations of all further jurisdictions in the federation and if at
some time in the future, the Eritrean Assembly and Ethiopia should agree to terminate that
agreement, the federation itself would be automatically dissolved without any possible recourse
or objection by the United Nations. 167
Thirdly, the United Nations kept silent when the federation was disbanded.
Article 31(3,b) of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties states that “there shall be
taken into account, together with the context, any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”.
The process of dissolution of the federation is the main practice that can show what the
intentions of United Nations General Assembly recommendation regarding the disposition of
Eritrea. According to Ambassador Zewdie Reta representatives of the major powers in Eritrea
reported to their respective governments that the imperial government of Ethiopia was
determined to dissolve the federation in its second year.168 The then Foreign Minister, who
represented Ethiopia during the negotiations to federate Eritrea, opposed dissolution of the
165
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federation that was being hatched in Addis Abeba and in fact he suggested that if the federation
is to be dissolved it should be through the referendum of the people of Eritrea but the Emperor
did not accept it.169
Michela Wrong writes that:
“Albert Reid, as head of the UN’s only remaining body in Asmara, reported on the
growing rivalry between Federal and Eritrean law courts and that eventually the Eritrean
question will again have to come before the General Assembly. Andrew Cordier,
assistant to the UN Secretary General replied “you should scrupulously avoid creating
any impression whatsoever that the United Nations has any interest in the political
situation within the Federation” he warned. “There now exist no basis on which the
United Nations can show any interest in the political problems of Eritrea and the Union.
Although the United Nations played the decisive role in the drafting of the Eritrean
Constitution…that job has been completed to the satisfaction of the General Assembly,
and that item has been removed from the agenda”.170

In 1955 Political parties were banned, trade unions were banned in 1958, in 1959 the name
Eritrean Government was changed to “Eritrean Administration” and Ethiopian law was imposed.
The federation was already dead when, on November 14, 1962, the Ethiopian parliament and
Eritrean Assembly voted ‘unanimously’ for the abolition of Eritrea's federal status, making
Eritrea a simple province of the Ethiopian empire.171
Had the system of federation been adopted with the primary objective of reflecting the
wishes of the inhabitants, the United Nations would have objected to the breach of its decision
by Ethiopia and might have tried to determine whether Ethiopia’s dissolution of the federation
was done according to the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea. One can deduce from the terms
of reference given to Commission of Eritrea and the factors that it considered in making during
168
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its recommendation, and the silence of the United Nations and the Four Powers when the
federation was disbanded, that main object and purpose of the Resolution was not to implement
the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea instead the decision was intended to make Eritrea part of
Ethiopia but to do so in a manner that would have the support of two- thirds majority of the UN
General Assembly.172
Also, the consideration of the security of East Africa was in essence the security of Ethiopia.
What the security of East Africa meant was not addressed in detail and countries had to decipher
it. British Sudan and French Somali land (Djibouti) which border Eritrea in East Africa had their
own sea outlets. Djibouti has a small strip of land that joins it with Eritrea. A major security
threat to these countries cannot emanate through Eritrea. They were under the protection of
powerful nations and the primary threat they faced concerned their relatively extended
Coastlines. The delegations of Guatemala and Pakistan which were in minority fully understood
what the consideration of security of East Africa meant and tried to address it head on. In their
memorandum they stated that:
It has often been reported that Ethiopia needs the control of Eritrean territory for
reasons of security against possible aggression from outside. Such a possibility does not
exist….. .173 An independent Eritrea- which can never become a military stronghold- could
never constitute a threat to Ethiopia.174The delegations stressed that a hypothetical future
aggression would be guaranteed by the United Nations and if the United Nations cannot
assure it, the control of the territory of Eritrea by Ethiopia may not safeguard it.175
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There were no major aggressions that affected the Sudan and Djibouti through Eritrea. But
through out its history, Ethiopia faced most of the major aggression through Eritrea. Italy and
Egypt made several attempts to invade Ethiopia from what is now called Eritrea. The Turks and
Arabs by controlling the ports of the Red Sea have been instrumental to the downfall of the early
Ethiopian civilizations. But even without a major aggression the security of a land locked
country is always at risk. As discussed above the geopolitics of the region may drastically affect
economic development because of obstacles in international trade. Poverty is an internal security
threat in countries like Ethiopia and most of the times it is the main danger to their existence.
The security of Ethiopia drastically affects the Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea and
Djibouti. That is why in the context of the United Nations Resolution the Consideration of the
security of East Africa is in essence the security of Ethiopia.
The recommendation of the United Nations Resolution recognized Ethiopia’s legitimate
need for adequate access to the sea. As discussed above these rights were not dependent on the
wishes of the then inhabitants of Eritrea and do not depend on the attitudes of the new state of
Eritrea. Ethiopia has recognized the right of self-determination of Eritreans however;
controversial this right may be, for the sake of peace and stability of this region. Conversely
Eritrea has to recognize Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea and be ready to solve the dispute by
peaceful means.
From the beginning of the process of disposition of the colony of Eritrea up to Resolution
390 V, i.e. navigating through the travaux preparatoires, the negotiations of the Four Power
Council of Ministers and their deputies discussed above, the fact finding commission of the Four
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Powers and finally the report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea one can observe that
the right of Ethiopia to have an outlet to the sea was at the center of the discussions. From the
operative provisions, the preamble and the travaux preparatoires one can only conclude that the
main object and purpose of Resolution 390 V was granting Ethiopia the right access to the sea
and a process of minimizing security threat.
According to Spencer, “The crux of the matter for Ethiopia in arguing her claim to Eritrea
was access to the sea; but the argument presented to the delegations at the Peace Conference was
that of historic, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic ties and the economic interdependency of
Eritrea and Ethiopia”
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foreign ministers, the Soviet delegate asked the Ethiopian delegation “Is Ethiopia prepared to
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Ethiopia. The General Assembly, at its 143rd meeting on 24 September 1948, referred the
question to the first committee. At the first meeting of the committee:
Opinions advanced at the 238th to 272nd meeting of the first committee, from 6 April to
13 May 1949, were predominately in favor of incorporating part of Eritrea in Ethiopia,
but there was wide disagreement as to the exact regions involved. (a) The eastern part of
Eritrea to be incorporated in Ethiopia, and a separate solution to be found for the west
part (United Kingdom, United States). The speedy transfer of all Eritrea to Ethiopia
(Liberia, Ethiopia). (c) United Nations Trusteeship with an Administration appointed by
the Trusteeship Council and to be assisted by an Advisory Committee. Territorial
concessions to Ethiopia to provide access to the sea through the port of Assab (USSR,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR) (d) The
northen part to be placed under United Trusteeship, with Italy as Administrating
Authority. The southern part of the region to be annexed to Ethiopia (Argentina,
Turkey). (f) Part of Eritrea to be annexed to Ethiopia on the basis of ethnic and religious
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factors with provision for an outlet to the sea. The remainder of the country to be placed
under United Nations Trusteeship, with Italy as the Administrating Authority (Belgium,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Union of South Africa, Venezuela) …..(I) Eritrea,
subject to the just claims of Ethiopia, to be granted independence after an interim period
of advice and assistance under the International Trusteeship System (eighteen LatinAmerican States)…. 177
With the exception of China, India, and South Arabia, all other counties recognized the
Ethiopian claim access to the sea. An Iraqi resolution (A/C.1/457) suggested that the General
Assembly appoint a five-member Commission for the purpose of ascertaining the real wishes
and desires of the inhabitants as to their future political status. It was rejected by 12 votes in
favor to 35 against, with 12 abstentions178 India had also demanded a plebiscite to be
conducted.179

As discussed above, during the second half of the third session of the General

Assembly in April 1949, the Bevin-Sforza formula which incorporated Eritrea into Ethiopia
except for the Western Province was supported by all including the Latin American and Soviet
blocs. 180
At its Fourth regular session the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
Resolution 289 A (IV) on November 21, 1949, established a commission made up of Burma,
Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa due to the fact that the available
information was considered insufficient by several delegates.181 And despite the report of the
minority of the Commission182 and no Eritrean Party demanded federation and despite the
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recommendation of Burma and Union of South Africa on the type of federation183 Eritrea was
federated to Ethiopia. ’Ethiopia was not to be federated with Eritrea but the converse, that Eritrea
was to be federated to Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown184The arrangement
was made so that Ethiopia’s access to the sea was ensured. Massawa and Asseb the two
‘Eritrean’ main ports were made to fall under exclusive federal (Ethiopian) jurisdiction.185
As discussed above, following a vote to that effect by the Eritrean Assembly, the
federation was declared terminated and Eritrea formally emerged with Ethiopia. The vote by the
Assembly had certainly been engineered.186 But the United Nations General Assembly nor the
Victorious Four Powers did attempt to verify that it was the wishes of the Eritrean inhabitants
nor tried to control it. And according to Shaw, Subsequent practice may act as an instrument of
interpretation187 In conjunction with the process of the making of the federation, the fact that the
United States, France and the United Kingdom from the Victorious Four Powers and Italy the
former colonial power supported giving Ethiopia an outlet to the sea with out consulting the
inhabitants of the colony of Eritrea and before the issue of disposition of the whole Eritrea, and
that almost all countries, even those who were supporting the independence of Eritrea, supported
the claim of outlet by Ethiopia indicates that the right of access to sea was the main object and
purpose of the ‘treaty’ between Ethiopia and the Four Victorious Powers.
The right of the Eritrean people to self- determination and independence does not
basically contradict Ethiopia’s right to access to the sea because these rights co-existed during
the development of Eritrea as a state and demand only territorial adjustments and compromises.
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The two rights are not mutually exclusive because Eritrea can exist as an independent state even
if Ethiopia gets back its coast of the Red Sea Afar (Asseb). As discussed above there have been
territorial settlements after wars or even by negotiations and compromises and modern states
continued to survive and in fact most of them flourished as states. Germany lost many adjacent
areas that it claimed were German to Czechoslovakia and Poland after the Second World War.
But it is one of the strongest economies even if it was forced to start from the ruins. Italy
conceded some territory to the former Yugoslavia and France after the Second World War but its
integrity is in tact. By the same token Eritrea’s recognition of Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea
cannot affect its integrity or its independence. The maintenance of peace in the region supported
by viable policies can create a condition by which the wishes of the peoples of Ethiopia and
Eritrea could be fulfilled.
Resolution 390 V eliminated the international boundary between the colony of Eritrea
and Ethiopia by making Eritrea part of Ethiopia. This resolution is too broad to make clear the
boundary lines that should now exist between the independent states of Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Although in some places, the territorial lines have to be redrawn again at least in some places,
since there are no concrete delimitation agreements or maps to show the exact boundaries. Most
of the boundary lines are clear, and correspond to the boundaries of the province of Eritrea when
it was part of Ethiopia. But some redrawing of the boundary will be necessary in order to
effectuate Ethiopia’s right access to the sea and will require negotiations and compromises as
described by Jennings:
If a treat’s terms are such as to impose on a party obligations which are very wide and
expressed in very general terms, those terms nevertheless be applied as they stand and if
necessary the parties will be called upon to negotiate a solution for the matters left
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undecided by the broad commitment undertaken in the treaty: Islamic Republic of Iran V.
United States of America.188
Redrawing could mean a large chunk of coastal land that is being controlled by Eritrea to
return to Ethiopia. During the discussions of the Victorious Four Powers before they submitted
the case of Eritrea to the General Assembly, there were different suggestions when they wanted
to implement Ethiopia’s right access to sea. Some of the suggestions could affect the integrity of
Eritrea as a state, while others may still create resentments on the part of Eritrea. France
suggested that “[t]he territories situated between the Gulf of Zula and French Somaliland should
be assigned to Ethiopia in full sovereignty.”189 The United States recommended the cession to
Ethiopia of the southern section of Eritrea (including the Danakil Coast, and the districts of
Akkele Guzai and Serai, the new frontier to start at the Gulf of Zula, following the northern
borders Akkele Guzai and Serai Districts to the Ethiopian frontier. The United Kingdom’s later
opinion was not much different than that of the United States. If the proposals of United
Kingdom and the United States are implemented they may destroy the integrity of the Eritrean
State for the territories would go deep into Eritrea. The obligations of Eritrea are very wide and
the implementation of the spirit of the Resolution in guarantying Ethiopia’s right access to the
sea is so general that it is only through negotiation and compromises that a lasting peace can be
achieved.
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CHAPTER 5
ETHIOPIA SHOULD BE READY TO DEFEND ITS RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE SEA
An Opportunity Missed
In 1991 as a joint venture between two rebel forces, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Ethiopia and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in
Eritrea the Military Dictatorship in Ethiopia was overthrown. Initially, the two governments had
relations which were admired by many as exemplary, although many Ethiopian had resentments
about the relationship alleging that it was to the advantage of Eritrea. The honey moon didn’t last
long, however. In 1996 and early 1997 Ethiopia tried to tighten the uncontrolled economic
relationships between the states. Eritrea was frustrated and relations deteriorated
In May 1998 Eritrean forces invaded Ethiopia using mechanized units and occupied
Badme town in the north west of Ethiopia. Ethiopia demanded the withdrawal of Eritrean forces
from occupied places and restoration of the ‘status qua ante’. Eritrea rejected this demand.
Many foreigners, who do not know the EPLF, led Eritrean elite, think that a minor boundary
skirmishes went out of control and developed into a full fledged war. Sally Healy and Martin
Plaut share this opinion and wrote “[i]t was against this background, in May 1998 that a small
border incident was mishandled and erupted out of control– neither side had planned it.”190
Ethiopia was unprepared for this war and Eritrea might not have planned for a full fledged war,
for the Eritreans might have thought that the Ethiopian government would kneel dawn to their
pressure and reverse its economic policies that tried to protect abuse by the Eritrean government.
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But, the Eritrean government was adamant and ignored different mediations and refused to
restore the ‘status qua ante’. Ethiopia needed two years to prepare. The fighting ended in June
2000 after Ethiopian forces dislodged Eritrean forces from border positions and the Eritrean
Forces were practically annihilated.
For the second time in its history Ethiopia won the war but lost territories by a peace
treaty. Christopher Clapham has drawn attention to the striking flaw at heart of the Boundary
Commission ruling, namely that it flew in the face of the result of the fighting –literally requiring
Ethiopia to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory”.191 It has lost (even if temporarily) its
sovereign right of access to the sea and some inland territories.
Ethiopia was the victim of aggression and given the political, economic, historical, and
security considerations discussed above its claim for an out let to the sea as a condition of peace
treaty cannot be seen as unlawful. Most wars, until the middle of the twentieth century,
concerned the acquisition of territory, and most of these wars led to exchange of territories. 80
percent of territorial wars led to re-distribution of territory for all periods prior to 1945 and 30
percent after 1945.192 After the upheaval of a major world war there follows a period of
“settlements,” or at least a period of “taking account” of what has happen. Territorial settlements
are one aspect of such a period.193 An historic procedure used to precipitate a territorial change
has been military seizure of territory, followed by a bipartite treaty of cession. Examples of
variations of this procedure were, military seizure of the entire territory of a state, followed by a
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“request” for its incorporation, expression of sentiment for annexation by some of the inhabitants
of a part of a state, followed by a bipartite treaty of cession,or military seizure of territory,
followed by confirmation by a multipartite peace treaty of the fruits of that seizure.194
Germany, Japan, Italy, and the other Axis collaborators were punished for leading and
participation of the war. For these countries to reassume their responsibilities as sovereign states
in international affairs and to qualify for membership in the United Nations they were made to
sign treaties that made them to renounce their rights as sovereign states and pay reparations. The
settlement elaborated in the peace treaties included issues of payment of war reparations,
territorial adjustments, War criminals, Naval, Military and Air Clause, claims arising out of the
war and settlement of disputes.195
After the Armistice, the Italian armed forces, both of the Government and of the
Resistance Movement, took an active part in the war against Germany, and Italy declared war on
Germany as from October 13, 1943, and thereby become a co-belligerent against Germany,196
Despite all this, Italy lost territories to France, Yugoslavia,…….and its ‘sovereign rights’ over its
African colonies. It was made to pay reparations, and renounce agreements that were to its
advantage.197
Germany was forced to unconditionally surrender. On February 22, 1944 British Prime
Minister Churchill stated in the House of Commons that:
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Here I may point out that the term ‘unconditional surrender’ does not mean that the
German people will be enslaved or destroyed. It means, however, that the allies will not
be bound to them at the moment of surrender by any pact or obligation. There will be, for
instance, no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany as a matter of right and
barring territorial transfers or adjustments in enemy countries. No such arguments will be
admitted by us as were used by Germany after the last war, saying that they surrendered
in consequence of President Wilson’s 14 points. Unconditional surrender means that the
victors have a free hand. It does not mean they are entitled to behave in a barbarous
manner nor that they wish to blot out Germany among the nations of Europe. If we are
bound, we are bound to by our consciences to civilization. We are not to be bound to the
Germans as a result of a bargain struck. That is the meaning of ‘unconditional
surrender.198
Prior to its war with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s right to access to the sea was clear as was
recognized by the United Nations General Assembly recommendation and the guarantee that was
given by the Four Powers to implement it. Even if the right was vague, it is the practice of
victors to impose conditions of surrender so that they are compensated for what they have lost
and aggression is not repeated. Eritrean government should have been “punished’ and the right
of Ethiopia access to the sea restored ones and for all. For tens of thousands of beloved sons and
daughters of Ethiopians that lost their lives in defending their nation, for the hundreds of
thousand of its people displaced, for the diversion and dragging of its economic and social
development, and for the loss of private and public properties Eritrea should have been made to
pay. The agreement should have been made to assert Ethiopia’s legitimate right of access to the
sea and reparation for at least instigating the war.
The Algiers Agreement gave the aggressor and the victim on equal standing as far as
responsibility for the war and for the mistakes done by the armed forces. It put the victor and the
defeated on equal footing. Violation of international humanitarian law, if any, by Ethiopian
Armed Forces should be accounted for but, only after the Eritrean Government which instigated
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the war and refused to solve the dispute peacefully after the war started has been made
responsible. The “Nuremberg Trail’ was established to prosecute the German Criminals but that
doesn’t mean that there were no atrocities by the victors.199
The lame and futile exercise of the Algiers Agreement had two articles regarding
responsibility for the instigation of the war and for reparation:
Article 3
In order to determine the origins of the conflict, an investigation will be carried out on
the incidents of 6 May 1998 and on any other incident prior to that date which could have
contributed to a misunderstanding between the parties regarding their common border,
including the incidents of July and August 1997.
1 The investigation will be carried out by an independent, impartial body appointed by
the Secretary General of the OAU, in consultation with the Secretary General of the
United Nations and the two parties.
2. The independent body will endeavor to submit its report to the Secretary General of the
OAU in a timely fashion.
3. The parties shall cooperate fully with the independent body.
4. The Secretary General of the OAU will communicate a copy of the report to each of
the two parties, which shall consider it in accordance with the letter and spirit of the
Framework Agreement and the Modalities.
Article 5
1. Consistent with the Framework Agreement, in which the parties commit themselves to
addressing the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population,
including the impact on those persons who have been deported, a neutral Claims
Commission shall be established. The mandate of the Commission is to decide through
binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the
other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against
the Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that
are (a) related to the conflict that was the subject of the Framework Agreement, the
Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and (b)
198
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result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, or other violations of international law. The Commission shall not hear
claims arising from the cost of military operations, preparing for military operations, or
the use of force, except to the extent those claims involve violations of international
humanitarian law.200
The invader was not made responsible for the war. No body can tell Ethiopia that Eritrea
was not the igniter of the war and responsible for what happen during the war by invading its
territories and refusing to resolve the dispute by peaceful means. The African Committee of
Diplomats201 did prove that Eritrea was the aggressor before the major offensive started. The
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission was forced to determine the origin of the conflict even
though the task was supposed to be given to another body to be established according to Article
3. Eritrea argued that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to consider the origins of the
conflict, but the Commission, controversially assumed jurisdiction and decided that Eritrea was
responsible for instigating the war. The Commission has ruled that Eritrea triggered the 1998 2000 war against Ethiopia. "[g]iven the absence of an armed attack against Eritrea, the attack that
began on May 12 cannot be justified as lawful self-defense under the UN Charter,”. In finding
Eritrea responsible for the outbreak of hostilities between the two countries in 1998, the
Commission stated that Eritrea had violated international law.202 An important implication of
this finding is that Eritrea will have to pay all the costs arising from the attack and the initial
phase of the war, although it will not have to pay the full costs. So far, the Claims Commission
has held Eritrea and Ethiopia responsible for different accounts and has given partial awards
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regarding claims arising from the treatment of prisoners of war, damages, and injuries caused to
the other state as a result of the conduct of war.203
The violations of Eritrea may be greater than Ethiopia but Ethiopia cannot be
compensated by this process. The endeavor is a very expensive process and the end result may
only be an account for history. Ethiopia is too poor to pay. If individuals and communities are to
be fully compensated, Eritrea’s economy may be drained..
Eritrea should have admitted that it had instigated the war and should have taken full
responsibility regarding the consequences of the war in the Algiers Agreement. The Claim
Commission was necessary but its primary mandate should have been to decide on the
compensation to be awarded to Ethiopia as a result of Eritrea’s acceptance of responsibility. The
commission might also have had the mandate to investigate whether Ethiopia’s response to the
Eritrean invasion was disproportionate and whether there were violations of international
humanitarian law.
Ethiopia Should be Ready to Defend Its Right of Access to the Sea
Despite the Algiers Agreement of December 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea are neither at
peace nor at war. In fact they are wedging a proxy war in Somalia. Ethiopia has a legitimate
concern in Somalia. Eritrea and Somalia do not have any border relations. Many people believe
that Eritrea is involved in Somalia to attack Ethiopia with the collaboration of other states who
want to destabilize Ethiopia. Eritrea within its 15 years of its existence have fought two major
wars with its neighbors Yemen and Ethiopia, and is in constant friction with the other remaining
bordering countries, Sudan and Djibouti . The final report of the United Nations Monitoring
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Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006) stated among other
things that:
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea Libya and certain Middle East Countries are arming the
Islamic Courts Union with anti tank and, anti aircraft and other weapons and supporting
them logistical materials and advisors. Eritrea is being used as a conduit and a platform
for, as well as a coordinator of, support for the Somalia ICU. The support is also for
Ethiopian opposition Oromo Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front
which are also operating from Territories controlled by ICU. 2000 troops from Eritrea are
inside Somalia supporting the Islamic Courts.204
Jendayi Frazer, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, reported that: “Eritrea is
fuelling the insurgency in Somalia in order to wage a proxy war against its arch-foe Ethiopia.
Eritrea was the largest foreign backer of guerrillas who are fiercely resisting attempts by Ethiopia
and the Somali government to pacify Mogadishu.205
Eritrea is arming, training and supporting armed Ethiopian opposition groups and
‘liberation fronts’ and it is almost official. The Ethiopian government alleges that Eritrea
masterminded the attempted bombings in Addis Abeba during the last African Union Summit.
Many people wonder what the Ethiopian government is doing in handling the case of Eritrea.
The Prime Minister said that, Ethiopia is following a ‘strategy of containment’ meaning that
Ethiopia is ready to destroy agents of Eritrea sent to attach Ethiopia and to make Eritrea
understand that it is impossible to destabilize Ethiopia206
The recognition of Eritrean independence was a courageous and principled one, but the
handling of the succession and especially the territorial disputes, was a disaster and lacked
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statesmanship-. I wrote in my LLB thesis: “[t]he author is unaware of Ethiopia’s preparation to
solve the imminent border issue to be raised by Eritrea. As the result shows institutions like the
Foreign Ministry and Ethiopian Mapping Agency were ill prepared for the border dispute.”207
Many people thought that Ethiopia would demand the restoration of its right access to the
sea but the Algiers Agreement on the contrary revived the defunct colonial treaties and made
Ethiopia a land lock country. The Algiers Agreement neither brought peace nor guaranteed the
legitimate rights of Ethiopia. Also it is important to note that the Ethiopian peoples were told that
the self-determination and independence of Eritrea means perpetual peace for Ethiopia.
The operative provision directly related to territorial disputes is article 4, which states:
Article 4
1 Consistent with the provisions of the Framework Agreement and the Agreement
on Cessation of Hostilities, the parties reaffirm the principle of respect for the borders
existing at independence as stated in resolution AHG/Res. 16(1) adopted by the OAU
Summit in Cairo in 1964, and, in this regard, that they shall be determined on the basis of
pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law.
2. The parties agree that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of five
members shall be established with a mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty
border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable
international law. The Commission shall not have the power to make decisions ex aequo
et bono.208
Eritrea was a province of Ethiopia during the Cairo Declaration. As far as Ethiopia is
concerned pertinent colonial treaties could only mean international treaties between Ethiopia and
the colonial powers surrounding it and most probably treaties between Italy and other colonizers
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that are related to Eritrea. Sub-article 2 is meant to revive the obsolete treaties.209 The Algiers
Agreement did not bring peace and stability. The very governments that signed it are the ones
who have refused to implement it more or less from the beginning. The Eritrean government has
violated the Algiers Agreement almost from the start. The agreement was for cessation of
hostilities, but Eritrea instead started organizing and arming Ethiopian armed groups. It had
violated the “Transitional Security Zone” a buffer Zone inside Eritrea which was agreed upon. It
has created obstacles and restricted the movements of the United Nations Mission for Ethiopia
and Eritrea (UNMEE). The Ethiopian government initially wavered about whether to accept the
decision of the Boundary Commission but because of public pressure it is not implementing it.
The Agreement is flawed and unless it is rectified the crisis will persist in one way or another.
The policy objective of any territorial agreement should be to render “stability and
finality”. This can be achieved if the treaty is based not only the acceptance of incumbent
governments but also the agreement of the concerned populations with less resentment. Yet, the
resentment is increasing among the population of Ethiopia including the cadres of the ruling
party. An agreement that is devoid of its inherent character of conflict management cannot bring
stability and finality. Stability can be achieved only if there is a condition to implement it.
Implementation pre-supposes actors who possess both the capability and the willingness to
ensure that the proposed arrangement can actually be put into effect. The balance of power at
both the regional and international levels matters a lot. Ethiopia Won on the battle field but lost
at the negotiation table. Ethiopia should have asserted its legitimate rights, especially the right to
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access to the sea. It is now paying for what it failed to do in December 2000. The government is
sandwiched between the stamp pressed in Algiers and the popular will. The winner is necessarily
in a stronger position than the loser. If Ethiopia, the stronger refuses to implement the unjust
agreement then stability cannot be achieved. Eritrea cannot implement the agreement unilaterally
because it doesn’t have the resources both human and material and is not capable of carrying this
burden. The international community and the Security Council are not willing to press Eritrea or
Ethiopia to implement it for reasons that they themselves know.
Ethiopia has to initiate a territorial dispute settlement process by which the rights and
claims of both Ethiopia and Eritrea are addressed so that peace stability and finality are achieved.
There are no ready made answers for the complex legal relationship of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Integrated principles of law should be employed in order to achieve a balanced, fair solution. An
integrated use of the interpretation of the UN Resolution, the doctrine of Uti Possidetis Juris and
the principle of self-determination with a willingness to make fair compromises may bring
lasting peace
A)

The UN Resolution
A new compromis based on the recognition of the UN General Assembly Resolution should

be agreed upon which recognizes, the just rights of Eritrea, Peace and security of East Africa and
the Sovereignty right of Ethiopia to access to the sea. Mechanisms of compromise to address the
legitimate interests of both countries should be in place. The territories of the two states should
be delimited anew in the South East tip of Eritrea:

Principles of equity as a means of

interpretation of the UN resolution used should be used. The Frontier Dispute/Burkina Faso Mali
case provides an illustration of the approach that should be used. In that case, the International
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Court of Justice essentially divided the dispute territory in half when there were inconsistencies
and gaps in the record. Although the court was barred from deciding the case ex aequo et bono
because the parties had not consented to this, it employed equity infra legem—equity used as a
“method of interpreting…the law in force.210
B) Uti Possidetis Juris
As an alternative and in conjunction with the treaty right the legal principle of Uti
Possidetis Juris which is regarded as customary international law should be invoked as a means
of asserting the right of access to the sea. The Cairo declaration of the Organization of African
Unity has also endorsed this principle. Uti Possidetis Juris is a doctrine under which newly
independent states inherit the pre independence administrative boundaries set by the former
colonial power. Eritrea as a province of Ethiopia had definite administrative boundary before
secession. These internal administrative boundaries could be the basis for the international
boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These boundaries are definite and at the same time
address the outlet right of Ethiopia. This would be an alternative means of solving the territorial
dispute, and would be similar to the approach used for the newly formed former Yugoslavia
States.
C) Self determination of the Red Sea Afar
The Afar peoples of Ethiopia were denied the self preservation of their ethnic group when they
were struggling to retain their people in the Asseb Administration Area and to keep it from being
incorporated into Eritrea because of the obsolete colonial treaties. They had the right to remain in
Ethiopia as a matter of both international law and the constitution of Ethiopia. Sharma states that
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there can be situation where a sub group of a parent group might demand territorial separation
and invoke a wide variety of justification including linguistic, ethnic, and religious and so on.211
He gives such examples as, the British on the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. By the same notion
Spain argues that the true and indigenous population of the disputed enclaves was of Spaniard
origin .212 Sharma is of the opinion that the legitimization of secession solely based on religious,
linguistic, ethnic, historical, and cultural considerations is impermissible under international law
as long as the government of the country is fully representative. Cassese has also supported that
notion by asserting that Self- Determination has also been used in the sense of rearranging the
territorial order of sovereign states with a meeting the demands of particular groups and
communities (for instance ethnic)213
In the case at hand, Eritrea is most probably the only country with out a constitution, no
formal check and balance and one of the most repressive regimes and the Afar in Asseb area are
second class citizens.214 In addition to the right to access to the Ethiopia can invoke the right of
the Afar people around Asseb to self determination and to join the majority of the Afar in
Ethiopia.
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The Afars cover the area highlighted in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. The big majority are in
Ethiopia. France suggested the highlighted area south east of Eritrea starting from the Gulf of
Zula up to Djibouti which is goes 60 kilometers parallel to the coastline.

77

In 2005, the International Crises Group stated that:
The Temporary Security Zone does not practically exist and the activities of the United
Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea have been restricted by Eritrea. Ethiopia is not
ready to implement the decision of Ethiopia- Eritrea Boundary Commission as it is. The
fragile peace maintained by Ethiopia and Eritrea since they signed a comprehensive
agreement at Algiers in December 2000 is fraying dangerously. With a costly two-year
war now followed by nearly five years of stalemate, patience on both sides of the border
has worn thin, and there are worrying signs that the countdown to renewed conflict may
have begun. Neither side appears eager for war, but to dismiss the tensions as mere sabrerattling could mean missing the last chance to preserve peace in the Horn of Africa.215

The situation has not improved and on June 27, 2007, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia reported to
the Parliament that:
With regard to Ethio-Eritrea case, the Ethiopian gov't is always ready to solve the
dispute through dialogue. It is also mandatory to carry out activities such as building the
capacity of the defense force to reverse the aggression which may be attempted by the
government of Eritrea. The Eritrean government and its allies are attempting to impede
the upcoming millennium celebration and thus further called upon the public to expose
those forces. The strategy pursued by the Eritrean government presently is a strategy of
wrecking havoc by organizing and training various anti-peace forces.216
Ethiopia’s sovereign right of access to the sea is still alive and the possibility of reversing the
missed opportunity may exist!!
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